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I. INTRODUCTION
Suddenly, the spotlight in securities fraud litigation is on institutional
investors. Institutions today hold about half the market value of publicly traded
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equity.' They also account for roughly seventy percent of trading volume2 and
collect the lion's share of recoveries in federal class action securities fraud
proceedings.3 Institutions have nonetheless been conspicuous by virtue of their
silence in the conduct of multi-million dollar class action securities fraud
litigation. That litigation involves billions of dollars of claims in which
institutional investors have the largest amounts at stake.
There are several cogent explanations for institutional investors' passivity
with respect to class action securities fraud litigation. 4 This passivity is,
however, under attack today as never before, and institutions appear to be
rethinking their traditionally inactive role in the securities fraud litigation
arena. A key provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(the "1995 Reform Act" or "Act") 5 establishes a new category of class action
plaintiff known as the "lead plaintiff."6 The statutory procedure mandated to
identify and select lead plaintiffs, together with the accompanying legislative
history, create a strong presumption in favor of large institutions over smaller
individual investors who have typically undertaken the role of name plaintiff in
securities fraud proceedings. 7 Indeed, the legislative history is clear that
Congress was concerned that small, individual investors were often incapable of
exercising meaningful control over class action counsel. 8 By creating the role
of lead plaintiff and by giving institutions a leg up in the procedures used to
select lead plaintiffs, Congress hoped that institutional investors would be able
to instill a sense of client oversight that Congress found absent in much
securities fraud litigation.9
Two other recent developments add to the interest in institutional
investor participation in litigation. One institutional investor has volunteered to
serve as class representative in a securities fraud action that was filed prior to
1. Carolyn K. Brancato & Patrick A. Gaughan, Institutional Investors and Capital
Markets, 1991 UPDATE (Colum. Institutional Investor Project, Ctr. for Law & Econ. Stud.,
Colum. U. Sch. of Law), Sept. 1991, at 8.
2. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J.
2053, 2056 n.10 (1995) (citing Supplementary Information to Securities Transactions
Settlement, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,891, 52,896 (1993)).
3. Id. at 2088-94.
4. See generally Part II, infra.
5. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (1995) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq.), which was enacted into law on
December 22, 1995 over the veto of President Clinton, amends the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994) [hereinafter 1933 Act], and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994) [hereinafter 1934 Act].
6. 1933 Act, § 27 (a)(3), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 739; 1934 Act, §
21D(a)(3), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 744.
7. 1933 Act, § 27 (a)(3), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 739; 1934 Act, §
21D(a)(3), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 744; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 369, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess., 32-35 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 731-34.
8. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 369, supra note 7, at 32, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 731.
9. Id.
These provisions are intended to encourage the most capable representatives of
the plaintiff class to participate in class action litigation and to exercise supervision
and control of the lawyers for the class. These provisions are intended to increase
the likelihood that parties with significant holdings in issuers, whose interests are
more strongly aligned with the class of shareholders, will participate in the
litigation and exercise control over the selection and actions of plaintiff s counsel.
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the effective date of the 1995 Reform Act, and was therefore not subject to the
Act's lead plaintiff provision.' 0 A second institutional investor has recently
moved to intervene in a state court derivative proceeding, thereby intruding
into an area that has also been viewed as the traditional domain of smaller
individual investors."
Are these events the harbinger of a new era in securities fraud class
action litigation? Are institutional investors about to emerge from a cocoon to
assert a profound influence on securities fraud litigation just as they have
reshaped the debate over corporate governance?' 2 Or are these recent events
transitory blips in history that herald no continuing pattern in institutional
participation in shareholder litigation?
This article suggests that institutional investors have rational incentives to
become more active in the litigation arena, but that the current debate is falsely
constrained because it rests on the assumption that institutional investors must
participate either by (1) assuming the formal role of lead plaintiff, class
representative, or intervenor or, (2) not participating at all. This is a false
dichotomy because, as this article demonstrates, institutions have available to
them a rich array of flexible, informal, and relatively inexpensive mechanisms
by which they can make their views known to litigants and courts alike. These
alternative, flexible, and informal mechanisms allow institutions to influence
the course of litigation without incurring the costs or exposing themselves to
the litigation risks inherent in strategies that require formal participation. These
informal means of participation could well prove to be the more cost-effective
techniques for the expression of institutional investor voice, and may supplant
the more formal forms of institutional participation that require lead plaintiff,
class representative, or intervenor status.
Put another way, if the age of institutional investor passivity has passed-
and it is far too early to relegate that period to the history books-the future of
institutional activism in shareholder litigation may look very different from the
world of institutional lead plaintiffs contemplated by the 1995 Reform Act.13
Indeed, the Act may ultimately prove irrelevant to an awakening of institutional
shareholder activism.
Our hypothesis that institutional investor activism is more likely to
flourish through flexible, informal mechanisms is rooted in practical
experience gathered in connection with the Institutional Investors' Forum at
Stanford Law School (the "Forum"), a group that first convened in December
of 1994. The Forum is a discussion group at which institutional investors meet
to learn about and discuss issues of common concern. The Forum takes no
position as a group, and has no authority to bind or speak on behalf of any of
10. In re California Micro Devices Sec. Litig., No. C-94-2817-VRW, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1361 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 1996).
11. Weiser v. Grace, No. 95-106285 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Apr. 6, 1995).
12. For a review of institutional shareholder influence over the governance debate, see,
e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice,
39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor
Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895 (1992); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1277 (1991); Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing With
Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1993).
13. Or the voluntary intervention in Cal Micro and Weiser.
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the institutional investors who participate in the Forum's sessions. The Forum is
properly described as a "coffee klatch" at which participants meet, discuss,
debate, and learn about issues of common interest, including matters related to
securities fraud litigation. It was as a result of Forum meetings that smaller
groups of institutional investors exercised their own independent judgment and
decided to participate informally in two shareholder class action securities
fraud proceedings: the litigation growing out of Intel Corporation's difficulties
in connection with a flaw in their Pentium microprocessor, 14 and the litigation
arising from allegations of fraud involving senior management at California
Micro Devices.15
This article reports in detail on the institutional investors' role in the
Pentium litigation, which consisted simply of writing a detailed letter to
plaintiff and defense counsel alike. That letter presented a detached analysis of
facts available in the public record suggesting that Intel's management may not
have handled the situation as well as possible, but that negated the inference of
fraud. The institutional investors requested that counsel respond to their
concerns and provide any additional information that would support a finding
of fraud so that the institutions could evaluate their preliminary conclusions.
The letters proved effective in suggesting, without concluding, that the
litigation lacked merit and should be dismissed. Plaintiffs' counsel in the
securities class action complaint against Intel voluntarily dismissed their
complaint a day before receiving a copy of the letter. Plaintiffs' counsel in the
derivative litigation against Intel decided to dismiss their companion suit within
ninety minutes of receiving a copy of the letter. These events demonstrate that,
at a minimum, institutional investors can identify complaints that should be
withdrawn because they lack merit. At a maximum, these events indicate that a
carefully researched letter to counsel sent by large institutions with a stake in
the outcome of the litigation can help persuade plaintiff counsel to dismiss a
claim that lacks merit. Formal participation and its attendant litigation cost and
risk may therefore be an unnecessarily complex and expensive means for
institutional investors to express their views on the merits of class action or
derivative litigation.
Before turning to the specifics of the Forum participants' involvement in
the Pentium litigation, this article first reviews academic literature that helps
place institutional activism in a broader theoretical context. Section II provides
an overview of the economic analysis of class action dynamics that has emerged
over approximately the last decade. In addition to describing the generally
accepted model, Section II extends the literature by analyzing in a more
textured way the effects that variable claim size and the presence of positive
portfolio values will have on the cost-effectiveness of individual monitoring and
on other participatory efforts by class members. We argue that the economic
model of class actions has, to date, concentrated primarily on a bipolar model
in which claims will either be significant enough to opt out of the class entirely
or small enough that they must remain in the class action and thereby be
susceptible to collective action problems. Our analysis suggests that there exists
a third category of situations in which it is rational for members of a class not
to opt out yet to become modestly involved through informal means because
14. See generally Part IV, infra.
15. See infra note 226.
[Vol. 38:559
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they possess claims that are sufficiently large, either because of the sheer size of
the claim or, more likely, because of the combination of claim size and the
possibility of generating positive externalities that increase portfolio values
over time, to warrant monitoring or other participation within the class action.
Class actions exhibiting these characteristics, including many securities class
actions, present a window of opportunity for new forms of institutional
investor activism.
Section I begins to place these theoretical observations into a real world
setting by examining the formation of the Institutional Investors' Forum at
Stanford Law School. This section discusses the initial preparatory meetings of
the Forum, the participants' objectives, the types of cases that Forum
participants thought might lend themselves to effective institutional activism,
and the types of strategies that the participants devised.
Section IV then turns to the Pentium litigation itself. The section
describes in some detail the flaw that was discovered in the Pentium chip and
how Intel's response to that problem exacerbated the situation the company
faced. The section also describes how these events affected Intel's stock price,
and describes the allegations lodged against Intel in the ensuing securities class
action, derivative litigation and consumer class actions.
Section V describes the Forum participants' evaluation of the Pentium
litigation and the strategy they devised to make known their concerns about the
merits of the securities class action and the derivative litigation. The section
also describes the outcome of those interventions. Section VI briefly describes
the Forum participants' assessment of the consumer class actions against Intel. It
describes why the institutions decided not to participate actively in those
actions, despite concerns about the proposed consumer class action settlement
and, more particularly, about Intel's and plaintiffs' class counsel's agreement
concerning attorneys' fees. Finally, Section VII describes some of the
preliminary lessons learned from the institutions' activities to date and evaluates
some of the provisions of the 1995 Reform Act in light of the Forum's
experience. Appendix A reproduces a copy of the "Pentium Letter" forwarded
by the institutional investors to plaintiff and defense counsel.
H. THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND CLASS
ACTIONS
The class action device is an attempt to overcome the problem of
dispersed injured parties whose damage claims are sufficiently small that they
lack incentives to pursue individual litigation.16 Absent the class action device,
collective action problems17 can prevent the aggregation of individual claims
16. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (1991).
17. This phrase refers to the difficulties that arise in any situation where discrete
individuals must coordinate their actions. Id. at 8 n.6; see LAIN MCLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE: AN
INTRODUCTION 11-12 (1987); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 1-2
(1965); PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
222 (1986). Collective action problems take essentially three forms: free-rider problems,




into one action that would support economically viable litigation.s Free-rider
problems are among the most common forms of collective action problems.19
In the presence of free-rider problems, no injured individual has an incentive to
undertake the costs of organizing the affected class because any individual who
attempts to join together the claims will have no method for taxing the costs of
aggregation to the other injured parties. If, as is often likely, those costs exceed
the individual's pro rata share of any damages, then each injured party would
rationally prefer to allow the others to undertake the costs of bringing a claim
while she reaps the benefits for free. 20 Indeed, even if it is individually rational
for one party to cause the class to form, each litigant would rather see someone
else bear the costs.
Transactions costs present another significant impediment to dispersed
claimants, both in organizing the injured claimants and in effectively operating
the case. If the number of injured parties is large, joining all of the parties in a
single action would be unwieldy, and it would be difficult to communicate with
and coordinate the actions of the many plaintiffs.2 1
The class action procedure addresses these problems in several ways.
First, it creates an inexpensive method for aggregating claims because one
injured party can litigate the action22 on behalf of all injured parties, provided
that the representative party's claims are typical of the class' claims as a whole
and the representative party adequately represents the interests of the class. 23
More importantly, the class action procedure vests in the plaintiffs lawyer
financial incentives to prosecute the action on behalf of the affected class. 24
18. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 679 (1986).
19. MCLEAN, supra note 17, at 143-47.
20. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 8; see Grundfest, supra note 12, at 908.
21. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 8-9.
22. The party seeking class certification must, of course, demonstrate that the action fits
into one of the three subcategories described in Rule 23(b). FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (1966).
Shareholder class actions are most often certified under Rule 23(b)(3), in which "questions of
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and [the] class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy." Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), Advisory
Committee Notes, 1966 Amendments (recognizing that "a fraud perpetrated on numerous
persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for (b)(3)
treatment], and it may remain so even despite the need, if liability is found, for separate
determination of the damages suffered by individuals within the class.").
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Rule 23(a) also requires a showing that the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable and that there are questions of law or fact
common to the class. Id.
24. Although Rule 23 contains no attorneys' fee provision, the court has the power to
award attorneys' fees to the extent that the attorneys have conferred a benefit on the class or have
created a common fund from which the class members can recover for any injuries they may
have suffered. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970); see Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984).
There are two theories for grantingsuch awards. First, an economic rationale posits that such
awards are necessary to encourage private attorneys to litigate socially beneficial actions. Charles
Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys' Fees in Class Actions, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 656,
658 (1991). This is the private attorneys general or "bounty hunter" theory of class actions. See
Coffee, supra note 18, at 669 n.1. The second theory is based on restitution; because the
attorney has conferred a benefit on the class at her own expense, she is entitled to recover the
reasonable value of her services. Boeing, 444 U.S. at 478; Central Railroad & Banking Co. v.
564 [Vol. 38:559
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Plaintiffs' attorneys, who often receive roughly twenty to thirty percent of the
amount of any settlement or judgment as compensation for their efforts, 25 will
typically have more at stake in the litigation than any individual claimant within
the class.
A. The Classical Paradigm: A Bipolar Model
Over approximately the last ten years, an economic analysis of the class
action system has emerged based largely on the work of John Coffee, Jr.,26 and
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller. 27 This literature emphasizes that although
class actions resolve one set of collective action problems, they do so at a price:
they can create high agency costs 28 and generate an entirely new set of
collective action problems.2 9 This view of class actions recognizes that, like all
agency relationships, the interests of the agent (the class action attorney) and the
principal (the class) are not perfectly aligned.30 While the same misalignment
can occur in a traditional single plaintiff/single attorney relationship, class
actions present significantly greater opportunities for attorneys to engage in
opportunistic behavior because the representative plaintiffs typically small
stake in the action creates insufficient incentives for the named plaintiff or
other class members to monitor counsel's conduct. 31 Instead, it is often
suggested that the named plaintiff tends to be merely a "figurehead who adds
little or nothing to the conduct of the litigation,"32 other than to serve as a
Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1885); Silver, supra, at 657-58. Denying an award of attorney's
fees would unjustifiably enrich the class members at the attorney's expense. Id.
Courts generally are charged with awarding fees in class actions, which are calculated
according to one of two methods: the lodestar or the contingency method. Macey & Miller, supra
note 16, at 22-23. These methods and the misalignment of incentives they may create are
discussed in more detail below. See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
25. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHL L. REV. 877, 890 n.31 (1987);
Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2, at 2059 n.29 (citing Court Awarded Attorney Fees, Report
of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 247 n.32 (Oct. 8, 1985)).
26. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on
Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action]; Coffee,
supra note 25; Coffee, supra note 18; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The
Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 12 (1985)
[hereinafter Coffee, Unfaithful Champion].
27. See Macey & Miller, supra note 16.
28. Agency costs are those costs incurred to control inappropriate behavior in a principal-
agent relationship, like the traditional relationship between the individual client and her attorney.
The agent engages in inappropriate behavior when she does not provide her best effort in
performing her duties ("shirking") or where her discretionary behavior is guided by her own
self-interest rather than the best interests of the principal ("opportunism"). Coffee, supra note
18, at 679-80; see Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution,
Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LIT. 1537, 1544-46 (1981); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-09 (1976). Agency costs also include the residual costs of the agent's
inappropriate behavior that is not cost effective to deter or prevent. Id.
29. The collective action problems in class actions are similar to those found in the proxy
context. Grundfest, supra note 12, at 908-14.
3 0. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 12-27.
31. Id. at 19-20; Coffee, supra note 18, at 679-80.
32. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 83; Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2, at 2059-
60. Scholars are not alone in recognizing that lawyers instigate and effectively control the
conduct of this type of litigation; courts recognize this reality as well. See, e.g., Kamen v.
Kemper Fin. Servs., 908 F.2d 1338, 1349 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 500 U.S.
5651996]
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"ticket of admission" that confers on the class action attorney the ability to file
the suit.33
The costs associated with these problems are well-documented in the
literature and there is no need to reiterate them at length here.34 For present
purposes, it is sufficient to summarize two particular manifestations of these
problems: the misincentives arising from the award of attorneys' fees and the
potential for excessive litigation.
The differing incentives between the class and their attorney are readily
observable, and in fact can be exacerbated by the fee structures that
predominate in those actions.35 The prevailing method for calculating attorneys'
fees is the lodestar method, under which the court attempts to compensate the
plaintiffs' attorney for the reasonable value of the time she spent prosecuting
the action, with adjustments in certain cases based on the quality of the work,
the riskiness of the litigation, or other similar factors. 36 In this situation,
attorneys may have incentives to engage in make-work or otherwise to multiply
their charges, at least to the extent they expect the court will still approve those
fee requests. 37 Excessive charges of this nature are obviously contrary to the
interests of the class because any fee award is deducted from the common
fund.38 The incentives created by the lodestar method may also cause plaintiffs'
attorneys to settle for a lower amount on the eve of trial, even if they
reasonably expect that they could obtain a greater recovery for the class at
trial.39 This is so because just before trial the class' attorneys have completed
most of the work upon which their fee will be based, and they typically expect
insufficient additional fees by going to trial to compensate them for the risk of
losing and recovering nothing.40
The alternative method for awarding fees, the percentage of recovery
method, is gaining broader acceptance, but can also create misincentives,
including incentives for plaintiff counsel to agree to "premature" settlements.41
90 (1991) (recognizing that "[s]ecurities [class] actions, like many suits under Rule 23, are
lawyers' vehicles").
33. Coffee, supra note 18, at 683.
34. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 16; Coffee, supra note 25.
35. See Coffee, supra note 25, at 887-89; Coffee, supra note 18, at 669-70.
36. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487
F.2d 161, 166-69 (3d Cir. 1973), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.
1976); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1374-75 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Macey &
Miller, supra note 16, at 22; Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2, at 2071.
37. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 22-23; Coffee, supra note 25, at 887-88. For an
excellent critical discussion of the lodestar method, see In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688(N.D. Cal. 1990).
38. The 1995 Reform Act addresses this problem in one context by prohibiting the
payment of attorneys' fees from Securities Exchange Commission disgorgement funds. 1933
Act, § 20(f), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 756; 1934 Act, § 21(d)(4), 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 756-57. The 1995 Reform Act also limits attorneys fees in all
cases to "a reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages and prejudgment interest
actually paid to the class," although the Act is notably silent on what factors the court is
supposed to consider in making that determination. 1933 Act, § 27(a)(6), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.(109 Stat.) 737, 740; 1934 Act, § 21D(a)(6), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 745.
39. Coffee, supra note 25, at 888.
40. Id.
41. In Chesny v. Marek, Judge Posner offers the following example to illustrate this
problem:
Suppose a defendant offers $100,000, the contingent fee is 30 percent regardless
of when the litigation ends, and the lawyer is sure he can get a judgment for
566 Vol. 38:559
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Both methods create the potential for collusive agreements where the plaintiffs'
attorney barters a low settlement or a settlement paid predominantly by the
corporation rather than by culpable individuals for a high negotiated attorneys'
fee or for an agreement that the defendants will not oppose plaintiffs' attorneys'
fee request.42 These costs are ultimately absorbed by shareholders through at
least two distinct mechanisms. First, to the extent that litigation involving real
fraud is settled "on-the-cheap" there will be excessive fraud in the market
because of insufficient settlements that under-deter harmful behavior. Second,
because incentive structures in class action litigation make it rational to sue
defendants who are in fact innocent of any wrongdoing, social costs are
imposed in the form of excessive resources devoted to unnecessary litigation
costs. 43 At the end of the day, we may have too many weak cases filed and too
many good cases settled out too cheaply.
Another cost associated with these differing incentives is the potential for
excessive litigation because plaintiffs' attorneys may expect to profit from a suit
even though that suit may not be in the best interests of shareholders they
theoretically represent. Disputes over the extent to which such suits exist and
over whether (or, more accurately, how much) the actual merits of the
particular case matter in negotiating shareholder class action settlements have
been heavily debated since Janet Cooper Alexander's 1991 article on the topic.44
Certainly, all securities class actions do not fall in this category but the potential
danger presented by such strike suits has long concerned the courts in
connection with derivative and other shareholder litigation.4 5 Moreover,
several scholars have persuasively demonstrated the potential for plaintiffs'
attorneys to profit from filing non-meritorious suits because of the cost
$120,000 if the case is tried but knows that it will cost him, in time and other
expenses, $8,000 to try it. His client will be better off if the case is tried, for after
paying the lawyer's fee he will put $84,000 in his pocket rather than $70,000 if it
is settled. But the lawyer will be worse off, since his additional fee, $6,000
($36,000 - $30,000) will be less than the trial costs of $8,000 that he must incur.
720 F.2d 474, 477 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 1 (1985). See also
Coffee, supra note 25, at 887.
42. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 44-45; see Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra
note 26, at 24; Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2, at 2067-71 (describing circumstances
surrounding settlement of securities and derivative actions against Warner Communications and
some of its officers and directors). An example of such a settlement is the one General Motors
recently entered to settle class action litigation that alleged that older model General Motors
trucks were defective because they posed an excessive fire hazard in certain collisions. That
settlement, which was rejected on appeal to the Third Circuit, would merely have given owners
of allegedly defective trucks coupons toward the purchase of a new General Motors truck. In re
General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995). Judicial review, however, may only be a weak
constraint against collusive settlements. See infra text accompanying note 58.
43. Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REv. 727, 732 (1995).
44. Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991); see, e.g., James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the
New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903
(1996); Grundfest, supra note 43, at 739-43; Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment
on Professor Grundfest's "Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Commission's Authority," 108 HARV. L. REv. 438 (1994); Weiss & Beckerman,
supra note 2, at 2080-84.
45. See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966); In re Time
Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994).
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differentials and asymmetric stakes that prevail in class action litigation.46 In
these cases, the plaintiffs' attorneys, potentially with very little cost to
themselves, can impose substantially larger costs on the defense. Even if the
defendant believes that it is likely to prevail at trial, it may be cheaper for the
defendant to settle than to litigate the case to a successful conclusion. 47 Indeed,
the ability to impose costs on defendants may create incentives under certain
circumstances to file lawsuits even where the net present value of going to trial
is negative under a discounted cash flow model.48 In these situations, the costs
of too many lawsuits again will ultimately be borne by shareholders.
Although economists have identified a number of tools for reducing the
costs associated with agency problems, 49 the scholars examining these problems
have demonstrated that these tool can be largely ineffective in the litigation
context.5 0 Consider the problem of monitoring. In the traditional attorney-
client relationship, monitoring costs can be high because of the attorney's
greater expertise and familiarity with the record.51 In addition, the attorney's
actions are not always readily observable making it difficult to detect shirking
or other opportunistic attorney behavior.52 These same problems prevail in
securities class actions. The typical representative plaintiff is often a small
investor who may not possess the legal or investment sophistication necessary to
evaluate the legal theories asserted in the complaint or the underlying factual
merits of the case.53 In other cases, it has been suggested that representative
plaintiffs may have been recruited by class counsel or may otherwise have a
close relationship with counsel that may undermine their ability or willingness
to assess whether the attorney is acting in the best interests of the class as a
whole.5 4
46. Coffee, supra note 25, at 889-90; Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note 26, at
13-33 (discussing derivative litigation).
47. Gmindfest, supra note 43, at 740-741. The costs and benefits of litigating the case to
conclusion include the defense costs and any ancillary benefits the defendant derives from not
settling, e.g., developing a reputation for not settling cases that may decrease the number of suits
brought against it in the future. Id. at 741 n.76. Like the plaintiffs' attorney, the defendant will
often have additional strong incentives to settle cases rather than try them to conclusion. See
Alexander, supra note 44, at 528-34, 548-68. Even the court evaluating a proposed settlement
may prefer settlement to trial. See infra text accompanying note 58. The strong incentives against
trial on all sides of the case are the likely reason why the vast majority of class actions are settled
or are terminated by pre-trial motions. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2, at 2064; Frederick
C. Dunbar et al., Shareholder Litigation: Deterrent Value, Merit and Litigants' Options(Business, Law, and Economics Center, Washington University), Oct. 27, 1995, at 1 (finding
that from January 1991 through December 1994, 83% of shareholder class actions were settled
rather than reaching any other disposition).
48. Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of
Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1996); Bradford Comell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-
Pricing Approach, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (1990); Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang,
Real Options and the Economic Analysis of Litigation: A Preliminary Inquiry (1996)
(unpublished Working Paper, Stanford Law School).
49. Among the tools available in these situations are monitoring by the agent and bonding
by the principal. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 28, at 308. Macey and Miller suggest that
another strategy is to create devices that more closely align the interests of the principal and
agent. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 13.
50. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 13.
51. See Coffee, supra note 25, at 884.
52. See Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 13-14; Coffee, supra note 25, at 884.
53. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2, at 2060.
54. Id. at 2059-61. Much criticism has been lodged against the practice of class action
attorneys employing so-called "professional plaintiffs" as their representative plaintiffs in class
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These monitoring problems are exacerbated by collective action
problems. The shareholder with a small injury will have little or no incentive to
undertake the significant costs of effectively monitoring the entrepreneurial
attorney because he would incur all the costs of monitoring but only realize a
share of the benefits.55 Rule 23's solution to this problem-requiring the court
to approve all settlements56-- has been challenged as largely ineffective because
courts have neither the time nor the information necessary to review rigorously
the merits of the settlement. Courts reviewing class action settlements typically
invoke the "strong judicial policy favoring the resolution of disputes through
settlement."5 7 The court's incentives may reinforce this policy because
approving a settlement (even a clearly deficient settlement) will often be more
attractive than retaining the likely complicated case for further proceedings,
including potentially a long and protracted trial.58 This incentive is likely to be
particularly strong in districts with crowded dockets where pressures are high
to dispose of cases expeditiously.
The misalignment of incentives in class action litigation can also express
itself in the form of conflicts among class members. Consider, for example, a
mass tort class action in which significant conflicts can arise in structuring a
settlement that divides recoveries between class members who have currently
manifesting injuries and class members who have been exposed to the defective
product but whose injuries will only manifest, if ever, on a later date.5 9
Analogous conflicts can develop in securities litigation between, for example,
actions. Indeed, the 1995 Reform Act contains several provisions aimed at limiting this practice.
The statute states that "a person may be a lead plaintiff, or an officer, director, or fiduciary of a
lead plaintiff, in no more than 5 securities class actions brought as plaintiff class actions pursuant
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure during any 3-year period." 1933 Act, § 27(a)(3)(B)(vi),
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 739; 1934 Act, § 21D(a)(3)(B)(vi), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(109 Stat.) 737, 744. The statute also prohibits any payments for serving as lead counsel other
than the same pro rata share of the recovery that all other class members receive and any "award
of reasonable costs and expenses (including lost wages) directly relating to the representation of
the class." 1933 Act, § 27(a)(4), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 739; 1934 Act, §
21D(a)(4), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 744.
Although this system is problematic because it may impede effective monitoring of the
class action attorney, it is a logical outgrowth of the class action system. The so-called private
attorney general system is designed to create rewards for those who seek out specified wrongful
conduct. Because the attorney's potential rewards for finding such conduct are much greater than
those of many of the potential members of the class, it is not surprising that attorneys have taken
a much more active role in bringing such cases. Creating a ready stable of representative
plaintiffs, or creating devices to access such plaintiffs, is simply a way for the attorney to limit
the costs associated with bringing class action litigation. Coffee, supra note 18, at 682-83.
55. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 19-20. Practical experience supports this
observation. For example, individual class members with small claims rarely step forward to
contest requests for awards of attorneys' fees. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 689
(N.D. Cal. 1990); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
57. Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
828 (1982); see also In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that "the court starts from the
familiar axiom that a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial").
58. Alexander, supra note 44, at 566; Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note 26, at
26-27; Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 45-47; Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2, at 2066-
67.
59. See Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp. 902, 919 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 996
F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994); see generally John C. Coffee,




shareholders who purchased shares during a period of price inflation but who
did not sell those shares and those traders who bought and sold during the
period.60 Rule 23 attempts to address these kinds of problems by permitting
certification of subclasses, but the creation of subclasses may lead to even
higher costs61 because each subclass will likely suffer from similar collective
action and agency cost problems as the class as a whole, and because greater
transactions costs will be generated as the various factions battle over
distribution of any settlement. In extreme cases, conflicts can be so significant
that they preclude use of the class action device.62 Even if class members
overcome these problems and actively monitor the litigation, communication
and coordination costs remain substantial.6 3
All of these difficulties, either working alone or in combination, can
create rational apathy among class members.64 If class members rationally
calculate that active participation in the litigation has only a small likelihood of
affecting the ultimate resolution of the case-either because their interest in any
possible recovery is so small or because they anticipate collective action
problems will prevent a group response among class members-then those class
members may decide to take no action at all. 65 The consequence of this rational
apathy can be a class action attorney who operates not as the agent for the class
but as an independent entrepreneur who maintains a portfolio of actions, and
who is driven largely by his or her own self-interest in prosecuting those
claims. 66 The potential result is an inefficient class action procedure
characterized by either vexatious litigation or by premature termination of
meritorious actions.
Although this analysis provides a powerful explanation for many of the
problems that plague class action litigation, it overlooks a more subtle analysis
of the effect that variability of claim size and other factors can have on
resolution or amelioration of collective action problems. 67 Instead of
60. See, e.g., In re Seagate Technology II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Cal.
1994).
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
62. See, e.g., In re Seagate, 843 F. Supp. 1341.
63. Providing current information to widely dispersed class members is itself an
expensive and difficult proposition. If lines of communication are implemented, class members
still face the problem of devising a timely method for obtaining input on litigation decisions,
most of which are unlikely to involve simple yes or no propositions. Any system developed
would likely be so unwieldy that it would eliminate, or at least greatly impair, many of the
benefits derived from the class action procedure, which established the named plaintiff as a
means of eliminating these problems in the first place.
64. See Grundfest, supra note 12, at 909-10.
65. Seeid. at910-11.
66. Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 26, at 628; Coffee, supra note 18, at
677; Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note 26, at 12; Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 19-
27.
67. This discussion focuses on class actions seeking predominantly monetary relief
rather than claims seeking predominantly injunctive relief, i.e., those claims not certified under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) or state equivalents. Actions certified under Rule
23(b)(2) can exhibit many of the same collective action problems and misalignment of incentives
as actions seeking monetary relief. These actions, however, may contain a large ideological
component that significantly alters either the attorneys' or the class members' incentives. As
Professor Coffee has noted: "In much 'public interest' litigation, the structure of the 'public
interest' law firm-in particular, its independent board, its more limited ability to pay out
earnings to its attorneys, and its need to raise funds from donors in the future-may substitute
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considering the possibility that there is a range of both potential class actions
and different kinds of class members, most scholars have employed an
essentially bipolar model. This comment is not intended as a criticism-
employing a simplified, bipolar model makes eminent sense when one seeks to
demonstrate the presence of the dynamics summarized above. Nonetheless,
when searching for a solution to collective action problems, it is important to
define the optimal conditions that present the best possibility for individual class
members to overcome collective action problems.
The bipolar model of class action dynamics is premised on the
assumption that individual claims aggregated in the class action will all tend to
be small enough to prevent any single claimant or group of claimants from
monitoring the class action attorney or otherwise becoming actively involved.68
To be sure, some commentators have recognized that there is likely to be a
great deal of variability in the size of claims in a shareholder class action and
that the largest claimant is likely to be the most effective monitor.69 But the
analyses typically stop with that observation70 and then go on to observe that
such large claimants will have strong incentives to, and often will, opt out of
the litigation to avoid certain effects that are often present in class actions that
may tend to reduce the amount high stakes claimants can expect to recover if
they remain in the class action.71
In particular, class actions often exhibit adverse selection problems.7 2
Claimants with weak or non-meritorious claims (or, more accurately, their
attorneys) who want to obtain some recovery from the defendant will tend to
employ the class action mechanism rather than an individual action because they
hope that, despite the deficiencies in their causes of action, they may still be
able to recover from a global settlement of all claims. 73 In other words, these
claimants seek to become lost in the crowd and to obtain recovery because the
defendant or court is unable to distinguish readily these claimants from those
with more meritorious claims. At the same time, in settling cases there tends to
be an "averaging of claims" effect, whereby the presence of weak claims may
drive down the average expected recovery for all claimants. 74 Weaker
claimants benefit from this effect because they may be able to obtain some
recovery, even though they may not be entitled to any recovery on a strictly
for client control and produce substantial monitoring of attorney opportunism." Coffee, supra
note 18, at 680. For these reasons, actions such as these are beyond the scope of this article.
68. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2, at 2088; see, e.g., Coffee, supra note 25, at 894-
95; Macey & Miller, supra note 16 (authors focus predominantly on issues arising in "large-
scale, small-claims" litigation).
69. See Coffee, supra note 25, at 879, 895-96. Professor Coffee was an early adherent
of preferring the attorney for the largest claimant for the role of lead counsel. The proposed 1995
Reform Act takes the same approach.
70. See, e.g., id.
71. Id. at 904-17.
72. L. at 906-07; see George A. Akerlof, The Marketfor 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Bus. & ECON. 488 (1970). In economics, "[a]dverse
selection now refers to any situation in which an individual has knowledge about his own quality
(the goods he sells, his ability to perform, his health status) while whomever he is dealing with
knows only about the characteristics of the average member of the group." VICTOR P.
GOLDBERG, READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 2 (1989). In other words,
adverse selection is a problem of hidden information. PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS,
ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT 150 (1992).
73. Coffee, supra note 25, at 906-07.
74. Id. at 917.
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legal basis. But this benefit conferred on the weak claimants tends to harm
stronger claimants because those stronger claimants will tend to recover an
amount less than they could expect to obtain in an individual action.75 These
claimants will have an incentive to opt out of the class. 76
The adverse selection effect, when present, thus tends to drive the
"stronger" claims out of the class action. Those that remain in the class, this
analysis suggests, will tend to have unmarketable claims, i.e., weak or non-
meritorious claims or claims that are insufficiently large to support an
independent action. While this analysis appears correct as far as it goes, to date
there has been little attempt to delineate the differences among these
independently non-viable claims. 77 Instead, it has largely been assumed that
these claimants will, more or less, be victims of collective action problems. For
this reason, adherents of this view have largely eschewed improved monitoring
or other similar devices, and have instead gravitated toward proposals that they
claim will more closely align the incentives of the plaintiffs' attorney and the
class.78
B. The Expanded Model: Active Low-Cost Monitoring by Class
Members
In contrast to this largely bipolar model, we suggest that securities fraud
class action litigation may support a third alternative. This alternative is
reinforced by the recent emergence of a more textured view of the
"unmarketable" claims that remain in class actions, at least with respect to class
actions alleging securities fraud claims.79 Professors Weiss and Beckerman,
among others, have recognized that institutional investors are often the largest
claimants in securities class actions, with claims potentially large enough to
make individual monitoring actions within the class action cost effective.8 0 In a
75. Id. at 916-17.
76. See id. at 906-07. The recent breast implant litigation provides an example of these
phenomena. There, a class member with a strong claim could reasonably anticipate that she
would be better off if she opted out of the class action and pursued an individual action rather
than accepting the comparatively small sums available through the negotiated settlement. As a
result, many of the stronger claims did in fact opt out, leaving many of the weak claims in the
class action, a result that undermined many of the benefits of the settlement for the defendants.
Indeed, defendants in that case (as well as defendants in other mass tort class actions) anticipated
this problem and sought to protect themselves should the opt outs become too numerous. The
breast implant settlement provided that if too many plaintiffs opted out of the class, then the
defendants could walk away from the settlement. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. CV-92-P-100000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *17, *23, and *65 (N.D.
Ala. Sept. 1, 1994); see also Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 325 (E.D.
Pa. 1994) (noting that settlement contained such a provision), vacated, No. 94-1925, 1996
U.S. App. LEXIS 11191 (3d Cir. May 10, 1996); Coffee, supra note 59, at 1382 n.144.
77. Coffee, supra note 25, at 904-07.
78. See, e.g., Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note 26, at 12 (advocating that "the
law should seek to fashion the incentives that it holds out so as to align better the interests of the
plaintiff's attorney with those of his clients."); Coffee, supra note 25, at 881-82 (criticizing class
action reform proposals for their "excessive reliance on monitoring devices"); Macey & Miller,
supra note 16, at 105-16 (advocating that plaintiffs' claims be auctioned off with the plaintiffs
receiving the proceeds of the auction and the winning bidder retaining the difference between the
bid price and the recovery in the suit).
79. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2.
80. Id. at 2088-94. There had been some earlier mention in the literature of the
possibility of institutional investors engaging in monitoring efforts in shareholder class actions.
Professors Macey and Miller observed, in a discussion of inefficiencies in the Supreme Court's
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study of eighty-two class actions, they found that the fifty largest claimants
"4accounted for a median of 57.8% and an average of 57.5% of all allowed
losses, even though they represented only a median of 1.7% and an average of
3.5% of all claims filed."81 The average and median losses for these claimants
were $597,000 and $267,927, respectively.8 2 In fifteen of the class actions
studied, the "fifty largest claimants' average allowed loss exceeded $1
million."8 3
Weiss and Beckerman concentrate on the absolute size of the institution's
claim in the class action. However, the size of claims or potential claims in any
particular class action is only one piece of the puzzle because size alone may not
create sufficient incentives for institutions to undertake monitoring. For
example, even if Institution X has fifty percent of the potentially allowable
claims in a class action, if that class action is the only one the institution
reasonably expects to encounter "in scale," then it may still be rational to let the
traditional mechanism operate. In such a situation, it may not be cost effective
for an institution to design and implement monitoring or other strategies if they
may only be utilized once. This cost-benefit analysis may change, however, if
the institution can expect that it will have significant claims in many class
actions. In this scenario, a "repeat game" effect 84 may occur, and in those
circumstances the institution may generate sufficient positive externalities over
the course of its participation in multiple class actions to justify monitoring
costs in individual class actions.
Data cited in the Weiss/Beckerman article suggest that such a repeat
game effect may occur with respect to institutional investor actions because
institutional investors have a significant presence in the equity securities
markets as both traders and investors.85 For example, evidence indicates that in
1990, institutions owned over fifty percent of public and private equity
securities. 86 Other studies estimated that in 1992, institutional investors
accounted for roughly seventy percent of the daily trading volume on the New
York Stock Exchange.87
Moreover, even if the institution expects large claims in numerous class
actions, activism is unlikely if the marginal costs of activism exceed the
expected benefits from activism. Consider, for example, an institution that
expects to recover $1 million from a class action if it undertakes the role of
lead plaintiff, but only $800,000 if it engages in no active participation in the
class action. The institution will only engage in these activities if the cost of
activism (including opportunity costs) is less than $200,000. This analysis
interpretation of the notice rules, that notice to institutional investors holding large potential
claims in shareholder class actions "would serve due process values, and would also facilitate
potential monitoring of the plaintiffs' attorney by sophisticated claimants with relatively
substantial stakes." Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 33 n.103. Professors Macey and Miller,
however, only mentioned the possibility of using institutional investors as monitors in passing,
and did not develop any scheme for how such monitoring efforts might operate.
81. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2, at 2089.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See generally ORDESHOOK, supra note 17, at 441-84.
85. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2, at 2056 nn.9-10.
86. Id. at 2056 n.9 (citing Brancato & Gaughan, supra note 1).
87. Id. at 2056 n.10 (citing Supplementary Information to Securities Transactions
Settlement, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,891, 52,896 (1993)).
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suggests three factors that should strongly influence whether institutions
undertake more active participation in class actions. First, for the institution to
generate some positive gain, it must currently be recovering less than it
otherwise would recover from the class action if the class action procedure
were operating at a more efficient level. Although the evidence is far from
conclusive, some studies suggest that class members recover a low percentage
of their actual losses.8 8 If this is so, then institutions may be able to achieve
positive net benefits from activism.
Second, the level of activism should be a function of the costs associated
with the activities that generate positive benefits. If the only actions likely to
alter materially the institution's gross recovery are those with high associated
costs, then the marginal benefits may be outweighed in all but the rare case
where the institution has an extremely large claim. If this is the case, individual
institutions are likely to become active in fairly limited situations. Activism
may be increased in this situation if the costs can be spread among a group of
institutions. Activism may also be increased if the class member can devise
effective, lower cost strategies which may be utilized in a broader array of
cases.
A third consideration involves the amount "at stake" in any given class
action. It is inappropriate to view this amount as merely the institution's losses
in a case because activism may produce ancillary benefits that extend beyond
the merits of any given case. A common example of this type of effect from the
defense perspective is the mass tort defendant, like a cigarette manufacturer,
who will rationally spend more in defense costs than the probable jury award in
a given case in order to avoid an adverse judgment that may prompt additional
claims or awards against it or to develop a valuable reputation for tenacity.8 9 So
too with plaintiff class members; if a class member can foresee positive benefits
to its portfolio from individual actions (such as from a future decrease in non-
meritorious litigation), then she may take actions that would not be cost
justified from the perspective of the individual class action viewed in isolation.
A cost-benefit analysis still applies, however. If the class member determines
that individual action is still unlikely to enhance substantially portfolio values
over time, or if the costs of individual action still exceed the expected increases
in portfolio values, then rational apathy and a suboptimal level of monitoring
or participation are likely to occur.
These observations suggest that the bipolar economic picture of class
actions that has prevailed to date has failed to appreciate fully the effect that
other factors, such as disproportionately large potential claimants within the
class or the possibility of positive portfolio effects, may have on class action
dynamics. Figure 1 presents a more textured view; it depicts a continuum that
attempts to highlight the area in which collective action problems are most
likely to be overcome. In Figure 1, the significance of claims within the class
increases from left to right. On the far left side of this continuum are class
actions characterized by uniformly small claims, none of which are
economically viable as independent claims. This is the archetypal class action,
8 8. Id. at 2089.



















and the situation both courts90 and commentators 91 often address when
discussing class actions. Examples of this type of action include many consumer
cases 92 and products liability cases not involving personal injury.93 The claims
in these kinds of actions are all small enough that the classic collective action
scenario will tend to predominate because no class member is likely to take
independent action within the larger class action to monitor the attorneys or
otherwise attempt to address the high agency costs. Individual claimants may
still rationally undertake monitoring or other individual activities in this type of
action, but such initiatives are only likely if they can generate large externalities
with positive portfolio effects for the claimant.
In contrast to class actions with uniformly small claims or portfolio
effects, the class actions on the far right side of the continuum are characterized
either by the presence of at least some significant claims that are independently
viable as individual actions or the presence of sufficiently large portfolio
effects. 94 These claimants will have a strong incentive to opt out of the class
action. Mass tort cases provide the best example of this phenomenon. In these
cases, adverse selection and averaging of claims problems can drive out large
claimants and claimants with stronger cases.95
Between the two extremes lie class actions characterized by either: (1) the
presence of some class members with claims that are significant but not quite
large enough to make opt out a viable option; or (2) the presence of significant
portfolio effects but, again, effects that are not large enough to justify pursuit
of a separate action. This area presents a window of opportunity for a new class
of low-cost responses that are designed to overcome the collective action
problems inherent in class actions. These low-cost strategies provide an
additional set of tools, which are rarely used, that can have an attractive cost-
benefit ratio in a larger number of situations.
90. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985); Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
91. See, e.g., FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 555-56 (4th ed. 1992);
Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 3.
92. See, e.g., Miner v. Gillette Co., 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981) (dispute over company's
failure to provide promotional table lighter to certain consumers).
93. For example, a large number of product liability cases were brought against the
manufacturers and sellers of polybutylene plumbing pipe because of allegations the pipe fittings
deteriorated when exposed to warm water and chlorine. See Williams v. Shell Oil Co., 169 B.R.
684 (S.D. Cal. 1994). Because damages claims were often relatively small, many of these cases
were brought as class actions. See In re U.S. Brass Corp., 173 B.R. 1000 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
1994); see also Du Pont Joins in Plastic Plumbing Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1995, at
37; Settlement Approved Over Leaky Plumbing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1995, at D4.
94. The significance of claim size or of portfolio effects is not the only factor that may
drive opt outs. If entrepreneurial plaintiffs' attorneys can expect higher compensation in an
individual action, then they may cause their clients to opt out of a class action, even if it may
result in a lower potential recovery for their clients. See Coffee, supra note 25, at 881. This is,
of course, another example of the costs associated with the client's inability to monitor
effectively their attorneys.
95. Opt out is not inevitable, however, even if the claims are sufficiently large to support
an independent action. A plaintiff with such a claim may rationally prefer the class action device
because, among other things, it may reduce transaction costs, it threatens defendants with greater
liability thereby potentially inducing settlements, or it prevents individual claimants who obtain
earlier judgments from obtaining a disproportionate share of the defendant's possibly limited
assets. Id. at 904.
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Individual action of this sort is especially likely to be worthwhile, and
therefore more likely to occur, if the individual class members can achieve and
benefit from broader systemic sources of gain from these activities. In
particular, by improving the process in individual cases, even through actions
that might not be cost-justified by looking at that case in isolation, repeat
players can generate positive externalities that lessen these costs over time.
Again, the incentive to undertake such individual actions will be increased if the
large claimant can develop low-cost strategies that generate costs commensurate
with the likely benefits for individual actors.
Employing strategies that utilize this window of opportunity for
individual monitoring or other actions has the added benefit of not requiring or
depending on any reform of class action procedures. While there may be no
objections in theory to auctioning off plaintiffs' claims to the highest bidder,
such an alteration of the judicial process would likely face significant opposition
and would be unlikely to be enacted. 96 By contrast, encouraging monitoring or
active participation by those who may already possess sufficient financial
incentives to do so requires little more than educating those claimants about the
benefits of undertaking such efforts, designing strategies for those claimants,
and assisting those claimants in implementing the agreed upon strategies.
Indeed, it was the belief that significant and meaningful securities reform
legislation was unlikely that formed the impetus for creating the Institutional
Investor Forum at Stanford Law School. Although that belief ultimately turned
out to be mistaken, an examination of the principles underlying the Forum and
its activities provides a useful benchmark for evaluating the overall potential
for successful institutional activism as well as for assessing the possible effect
that the 1995 Reform Act may have on such activism.
III. THE FORMATION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS'
FORUM AT STANFORD LAW SCHOOL
A. Theory
Underlying the formation of the Institutional Investors' Forum at
Stanford Law School (the "Forum") was the recognition that at least some
shareholder class actions might fall in a window far enough toward the right
side of the continuum described in Figure 1 to make individual action
economically viable. The later publication of the Weiss/Beckerman data97
documented and reinforced the observation that institutional investors may have
large enough stakes in class actions to support some type of individual action,
even though those stakes may be too small to justify opting out of the class and
pursuing individual actions.
Moreover, there is more than just the mere size of the potential
recoveries involved to prompt institutional shareholder action. Institutional
investors should also be in a position to recognize broader systemic sources of
gain from activism. Like all shareholders, institutional investors are harmed by
fraud and have incentives to reduce the incidence of fraudulent activities in the
96. Indeed, as will be more fully explored below, even the reforms contained in the 1995
Reform Act may have been unnecessary. See infra Section VII.
97. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2, at 2088-94.
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securities markets.98 At the same time, institutional investors' large presence in
the market over time means that they will tend to bear a greater portion of the
costs imposed by inefficiencies in class action litigation.99 For example, when
plaintiffs' class action attorneys are able to obtain a settlement in a case that
may have little substantive merit simply because they have an ability to impose
substantial litigation costs on defendants, institutional investors bear a large
share of the inefficiency costs generated by this litigation through their
shareholdings. Inefficiencies of this sort will essentially impose a tax on capital
formation that will be reflected in higher capital costs or insufficient capital
formation as too many resources are spent on litigation costs and litigation
avoidance. 100 If the institutions that bear a large share of these costs can
undertake initiatives in individual class litigation to make class actions generally
more efficient, they may be able to enhance sufficiently their portfolio values to
justify the expense of the individual initiatives. Indeed, this is the same type of
analysis that has led some institutional investors to become active in corporate
governance issues. 101
Because they bear the costs associated with both the presence of fraud and
of inefficiencies in class action litigation, institutions have natural incentives to
seek a balanced resolution of the problems presented by securities class
litigation. Those incentives closely reflect society's aggregate interests. 102
Institutional investors may therefore represent the best, although clearly an
imperfect, proxy for the public interest in shareholder litigation, rather than
the individual investor who one more often thinks of in this context. Indeed, the
interests of the individual investor and the institution may be adverse, or at least
may not be coterminous, in a given class action. This dissonance is not
necessarily a signal that the institution's position should be ignored because it
may be that the institution's position, rather than that of the individual investor,
is more harmonious with society's larger interests. An individual investor is
likely to have a comparatively small stake in a given class action, as well as
comparatively small equity holdings in general. Such a shareholder may not
rationally care about inefficiencies in the class action system. By contrast, the
size of institutional investors' holdings and the fact that they collect a
disproportionately large percentage of class action recoveries should lead
institutions to balance their interests against being victims of fraud with their
interests in minimizing the costs imposed by shareholder class litigation.
While it is important to recognize these differences between the
institutional investor and the average shareholder, it is also important to
recognize that the larger institutions are in many cases aggregations of small
investors. Collective action problems and the difficulty of focusing on larger
98. Grundfest, supra note 43, at 732; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 369, supra note 7, at 34,
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 734.
99. See Grundfest, supra note 43, at 732.
100. See id. Of course, the presence of fraud will have similar effects because the
corporation's shareholders will bear these costs through employment agreements or through the
costs of directors' and officers' insurance policies. Dunbar et al., supra note 47, at 12 n.22;
Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and
Class Action Law Suits, 60 B.U. L. REV. 542, 568 (1980).
101. See generally Grundfest, supra note 12 (discussing institutional action in a corporate
governance context).




systemic concerns mean that the individual investor has little incentive to focus
on the big picture. 103 A major mutual or pension fund, which in reality
comprises the holdings of many smaller investors, can take that broader view.
Thus, politically and socially, the institutional investor represents much the
same constituency as the individual investor.104 Focusing on the needs of
institutional investors, however, causes that constituency to consider its entire
portfolio and the full consequences of its actions.
The formation of the Forum was also premised on the belief, which
ultimately turned out to be mistaken, that securities reform legislation was
unlikely to be enacted. Under that assumption, it was believed that large
institutional investors had available to them techniques for overcoming
collective action problems and for influencing the conduct of litigation without
the need for any legislative reform. Intriguingly, the 1995 Reform Act does in
fact provide a concrete role for institutional investors.105 The experience of the
Forum's participants to date, however, raises concerns with respect to this
legislative initiative, particularly the provisions regarding the appointment of
lead plaintiffs. The Act's emphasis on encouraging institutions to play that role
may represent a higher cost strategy than may be necessary to achieve positive
benefits in shareholder class litigation and, in fact, may make institutional
initiatives too costly in all but the rare case. These concerns are more fully
discussed later in the paper. 06
B. Practice
The Forum is a loose and informal gathering of institutional investors
which seeks to act as a vehicle for responding in a textured way to challenges
posed b , the lack of policing of shareholder and securities litigation. Its closest
model is the coffee klatch. The Forum makes no decisions, can bind none of its
participants, and leaves all decision making to the independent judgment of each
participating institutional investor.107 The Forum is a vehicle for discussion, not
a decision making body.
The Forum began with a series of three informational meetings. The first
meeting was among representatives of institutions with total assets in excess of
$500 billion. At this first meeting, institutional representatives shared
information and concerns about class action and other shareholder litigation and
the role that institutions might play in those cases. These representatives were
encouraged to speak broadly about possible strategies for the Forum. The
primary goal of this session was to "test the waters" by searching for common
interests, concerns, and uncertainties so as to construct a future agenda that
might provide a foundation for collective action in litigation.
The second preparatory meeting brought together leading plaintiffs
lawyers, defense lawyers, the General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and judges. This meeting was a full day session the goal of which
103. See supra notes 16-78 and accompanying text.
104. The legislative history to the 1995 Reform Act recognizes that institutional investors
are really just conglomerations of smaller investors. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 369, supra note 7,
at 34, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 733.
105. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
106. See infra Section VII.
107. Needless to say, under these circumstances, the Forum does not represent the views
of Stanford Law School or any of its faculty.
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was to talk through problems and opportunities in the field of shareholder
litigation.
A third meeting was then held to discuss strategies in light of the
information garnered from the first two meetings and from additional research.
At that time, some general themes evolved. Participants perceived the Forum as
an experiment that would involve a great deal of learning by doing. To bring
structure to that process participants observed that they would prefer to start
with low-cost approaches before experimenting with more costly strategies. In
addition, it was observed-in keeping with the notion that institutions have
incentives to reduce the costs associated with fraud as well as the costs
associated with inefficient class actions-that the Forum participants should
strive for a balanced approach to institutional investor activism. In other words,
there should be no predisposition in support of either the defense or the
plaintiff side, and Forum participants should search for opportunities to
participate from varying perspectives.
The desire to stress a balanced approach to class actions resulted in the
decision to focus on three different kinds of problems that may exist as a result
of collective action problems. First, the Forum would search for opportunities
for institutional participation in those class actions that appeared to lack merit.
These cases would include those which might have been brought even though
the negative portfolio effects on shareholders in general were greater than any
expected benefit in the litigation.108
Second, the Forum would search for opportunities for institutional action
in cases where it determined that proposed settlements were too easy on
defendants. Among such situations, the Forum participants were interested in
finding cases where settlements were structured so that the corporate entity paid
while the culpable individuals were let off.109 These situations represent another
agency problem inherent in class actions. The plaintiffs' class action attorney
has an incentive to maximize the total settlement amount, so that its own fee is
increased.110 That attorney cares little, if at all, about the deterrent effect of any
settlement.' So too, the individual shareholder with narrow holdings who does
not bear the brunt of the costs associated with class action inefficiencies will
rationally care about the total size of the settlement, with little regard for
deterrence. While an institution also cares about the total settlement amount, its
broader presence in the securities markets creates incentives to maximize the
108. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
109. Jones, supra note 100, at 568. Studies conducted by National Economic Research
Associates have found that director and officer defendants contribute personally to settlements in
only a small number of cases and in those cases their contribution is often only a small portion of
the total settlement payments. Dunbar et al., supra note 47, at 12.
110. This is certainly true if the attorney is paid on a contingency basis. It is also true if the
attorney's fee is calculated under the lodestar method. The higher the settlement amount, the
greater the support the attorney can expect from the plaintiff class. The size of the fund created
for investors is also a factor in a court's determination of the appropriate fee. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting that result
obtained is factor in determining award of attorneys' fees). Finally, it is possible that executives
or directors who also may be defendants in the class action will agree to a higher settlement, or
will undertake not to oppose any fee request, if the defendant corporation pays the settlement
amount.
111. Indeed, it may be against the best interests of a plaintiffs' attorney to maximize
deterrence because this may cause a net decrease in the number of securities frauds in the future,
thereby decreasing the number of opportunities for filing shareholder class litigation.
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deterrent effect of settlements so that the overall costs of fraud are reduced
because these benefits may exceed the potential for an excessive recovery in any
given case. This alternative view means that the institution may, in a particular
case, care more about where the money comes from (i.e., the structure of the
settlement) rather than the total amount paid. For example, an institution could
rationally prefer a $5 million payment that comes directly from the culpable
officers and directors over a $10 million payment by the corporation or its
insurance carrier. Such a settlement may have a greater positive benefit for
institutions over time because it may do more to deter future fraudulent
conduct. At that same time, the institutions recognized that care was necessary
in this area so that capable people are not deterred from becoming officers and
directors of corporations by the prospect that judicial error could expose them
to potentially large damage awards even if they engaged in no violative
conduct.
A third opportunity identified by Forum participants was composed of
situations where it appeared that litigation would be worthwhile but was not
being pursued. In these situations, the institutions' stakes may have been
sufficiently large that it would have been worthwhile to commence an
individual or class action. The group, however, was not optimistic that it would
be able to find many such potential cases.
In addition to identifying these general areas for activity, in the first set
of meetings the Forum participants also focused on four strategies the
institutions generally found worthy of further consideration. First, the
institutions sought to supply an investor voice with respect to litigation that
appeared to lack merit. Such a voice could be provided through, for example, a
letter to class counsel to the effect that the signatories represent a significant
portion of the purported class and believe the action to be without merit and
costly to their investment. Such a letter would ask that the litigation be
dismissed or that class counsel respond to their concerns. Second, the Forum
participants were generally in favor of proposals to promote competition
among counsel for the right to represent the class, in the direction of Judge
Vaughn Walker's competitive bidding approach for the selection of lead
counsel, as a method for reducing the costs of litigation." 2
Third, the Forum participants observed that it could be beneficial to
oppose requests for attorneys' fees where those fees appeared too high, even
where the Forum supported the substance of a proposed settlement. Finally, the
Forum participants observed that it may be worthwhile, in appropriate cases, to
object to a settlement itself to attempt to force plaintiffs' lawyers to try the case
when there was a concern that a meritorious action was being settled too
cheaply, or that culpable parties were not being held individually responsible,
thereby lessening the deterrent effect of the law.
The Forum's approach is quite different from the lead plaintiff model
proposed by Weiss and Beckerman and adopted in the 1995 Reform Act." 3
Indeed, Professors Weiss and Beckerman suggest that any role other than the
lead plaintiff role would be largely ineffective, both because the institution
112. See, e.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1990); In re Oracle
Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990). In these cases, Judge Walker recognized many
of the collective action problems and the misalignment of incentives discussed in this paper.
113. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text.
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"would have less influence over plaintiffs' attorneys" and because the institution
would have to pay its own attorneys' fees and a share of the fees payable to lead
counsel.114 While it is true that institutions that do not choose to pursue the lead
plaintiff role will lose the opportunity of appointing lead counsel, this does not
mean that they will entirely lose their influence over class counsel. As a
practical matter, the mere fact that an institution is a large, sophisticated
claimant that possesses a significant portion of the alleged claims in the class
action should lend significant credence to the views it expresses. Moreover,
Professors Weiss' and Beckerman's discounting of the costs associated with
serving as lead plaintiff seems overly optimistic. They fail to consider
adequately the costs associated with, for example, identifying in a timely
fashion the class actions where becoming lead plaintiff will be cost effective and
the opportunity and other costs related to discovery, such as the significant
expenditure of time necessary for identifying and producing documents and
testifying at depositions.t 1 5 Although some, but probably not all, of these costs
can be recovered under the 1995 Reform Act,11 6 that recovery is contingent
upon a favorable outcome and may only come after a significant time lag. It
seems likely that institutions will also consider significant the less quantifiable
costs associated with the greater scrutiny of their investment decisions,
philosophy, and practices and of their actions as lead plaintiff that should come
with assuming the lead plaintiffs spot. 117 Indeed, the historical reluctance of
institutions to participate actively in class actions may be driven in large part by
their unwillingness to undergo such scrutiny.
Taken together, these factors suggest that an institution may only be
willing to seek to become lead plaintiff where it expects a very large return
from taking on that role. These cases may be quite rare, thereby limiting the
opportunities for institutional activism. This analysis is similar to the one that
led the Forum participants to favor lower cost/lower visibility approaches. Such
approaches do not require as significant an increase in recoveries in order to be
cost effective, nor do they expose the institution to the same scrutiny as would
becoming lead plaintiff. A real world demonstration of the potential
effectiveness of these low-cost strategies-the Forum participants' participation
in the Pentium litigation-is discussed below.
IV. THE FIRST TEST FOR THE FORUM: THE PENTIUM
FLAW AND THE ENSUING LITIGATION
Contemporaneous with the Forum's third meeting in January 1995, a
number of the individual institutional investors discussed taking action in class
action and related litigation that had recently been brought against Intel
Corporation and certain of its officers and directors as a result of flaws in
Intel's Pentium chip. The California Public Employees' Retirement System, the
College Retirement Equities Fund, the Stanford Management Company, and
Wells Fargo Institutional Trust Company, were members of the shareholder
class as pleaded in the complaints and were also current Intel shareholders.
114. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2, at 2096.
115. 1933 Act, § 27(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 739; 1934 Act, §
21D(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 744.
116. 1933 Act, § 27(a)(4), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 739; 1934 Act, §
21D(a)(4), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 744.
117. See infra Section VII.
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These four institutional investors agreed that if the data and underlying analysis
supported the conclusion that these cases appeared to lack merit, they would
support a letter to counsel explaining the basis for their concerns and asking
counsel to respond with further information in support of plaintiffs' claims.
The decision to write a letter to class counsel, instead of pursuing some
other strategy, was based on a number of strategic observations. First, the
strategy was inexpensive. When experimenting with a new approach of
uncertain effectiveness, institutional investors are reasonably interested in
minimizing the cost of their participation so that a failed effort does not impose
a burden on their funds. Strategies that can be described as "least cost"
approaches to the resolution'of collection action problems therefore have a
particular appeal, especially as starting points for practical action.
Second, the institutional investors determined that they did not want to
prepare a formal court filing if alternative, effective modes of communication
were available. The informality of the proposed communication meant that the
institutions would not have to retain counsel or obtain internal approvals that
might otherwise be necessary as a precondition to a formal appearance.
Third, the strategy was reversible and did not commit the institutions to
any particular position. Because the letter posed detailed questions to class
counsel, counsel was always free to explain that the institutional investors had
misperceived the claim or failed to consider all relevant information. In that
event, the institutions remained free to change the position suggested by the
initial analysis supporting the letter.
Fourth, the approach was consistent with the investors' fiduciary
obligations to their beneficiaries. By seeking further information designed to
help them evaluate the merits of a claim, the institutions were clearly acting in a
manner consistent with their fiduciary obligations. If plaintiffs' counsel were
unable to respond cogently to concerns raised in the letter, the institutions
would gain information valuable for any further decisions regarding the
exercise of their claims.
Fifth, the institutional investors recognized that if this low-cost strategy
was to have a reasonable chance of success, it was necessary for the letter to
contain a significant degree of detail and substance. If the correspondence
lacked analytic heft, it could either be marginalized by plaintiffs' counsel or
produce a highly subjective or idiosyncratic response that would not address the
substance of the investors' concerns. As a result, the institutional investors
authorized a careful study of the class and derivative actions as well as a
detailed statistical analysis of Intel's stock price movements during the relevant
period. A substantive, thoughtful, and detached response to such a letter would
be necessary for purposes of plaintiffs' credibility.
The institutional investors ultimately determined, based on the outcome
of the analysis they authorized, to pursue the proposed strategy of sending a
letter to counsel in the class and derivative actions that questioned the merits of
those actions. Before discussing the specific concerns raised in the letter,
however, it is first necessary to provide some background on the Pentium flaw,
Intel's response to that flaw, and a description of the litigation that ensued.
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A. The Pentium Flaw and Intel's Response
Intel introduced the Pentium Processor in May 1993.118 As an integral
part of its strategy to maintain market share as rival companies began to market
copies of Intel's earlier 386 and 486 chips, and as margins on these earlier
product lines began to decline." 9 Intel also sought to attract more users from
the scientific and engineering communities by improving the Pentium chip's
mathematical performance in comparison to the performance of predecessor
386 and 486 chips. 20 Unknown to Intel when it first began production of the
microprocessor, however, was that there was a software flaw embedded in the
Pentium that would affect the chip's performance in certain applications.
The flaw involved the application of an algorithm to certain floating
point calculations.12 1 The algorithm the Pentium chip employs uses a look-up
table (i.e., a matrix of precomputed values) to calculate intermediate quotients
for iterative floating point divisions. 22 In essence, the microprocessor estimates
successive digits in the answer by looking up numbers in the table. 2 3 The
Pentium flaw resulted from an error in downloading a look-up table from the
previous generation 486 chip into the Pentium. As a consequence of this error,
five of the entries that were supposed to be contained in the table were
missing. 24 Those five cells, which were supposed to contain the constant +2,
instead were empty and were read by the computer as zeros, thereby skewing
certain computations.125 This flaw was sufficiently subtle that it was apparently
not discovered in the approximately 10 billion tests Intel performed on the
Pentium prior to its release, 126 and Intel did not become aware of the problem
until June 1994 when additional testing disclosed it after the chip was already in
production.127
118. Peter H. Lewis, I.B.M. Halts Sales of its Computers with Flawed Chip, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1994, at C6.
119. See Don Clark, Intel Is Embarking on Big Campaign to Buoy Pentium, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 27, 1994, at B4.
120. Linley Gwennap, How Bad Is the Pentium FPU Bug?, MICROPROCESSOR REP.,
Dec. 26, 1994, at 11.
121. The size of numbers that a CPU, like the Pentium, can handle in a single calculation
is limited by the computer's word length. A computer using an 8-bit word cannot
simultaneously process numbers larger than 255 (28-1). To eliminate this problem, computers
use floating point notation, a system where large numbers are represented as fractions multiplied
by a power often. For example, the number 597 can be written as 5.97 x 102. The advantage of
such a system is "the ability to represent the significant digits of data with values spanning a
large dynamic range limited only by the capacity of the exponent field." JONAR C. NADER,
PRENTICE HALL'S DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING 176-77 (1992). The disadvantage of the
system is that only the significant digits can be represented. Thus, in a system limited to five
significant digits, there is no difference between 123451 and 123452, both are represented as
1.2345 x 105. Id.
122. Tom R. HalfhilU, The Truth Behind the Pentium Bug, BYTE, Mar. 1995, at 163.
123. Gwennap, supra note 120, at 11; David Stipp, What Do You Really Need to Know
About the Floating Point?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 1994, at B6.
124. Gwennap, supra note 120, at 11.
125. Halftill, supra note 122, at 163. This was not the only flaw in the Pentium chip, as
subsequent disclosures revealed. Linley Gwennap, Intel Releases Pentium Errata List,
MICROPROCESSOR REP., Mar. 6, 1995, at 15. However, these flaws were not unusual for a
new microprocessor. Id.
126. Sebastian Rupley, When Good Chips Go Bad, PC MAG., Feb. 7, 1995, at 32; see
also Tom Abate, Chip Flaw Not Intel's Only Error, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 18. 1994, at B-I.
127. INTEL CORP., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF FLOATING POINT FLAW IN THE
PENTIUM(TM) PROCESSOR (1994) 1 (Nov. 30, 1994) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ANALYSIS];
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Similar flaws are not uncommon in the computer industry. Problems
appear on a fairly regular basis in new hardware (including Intel's earlier 386
and 486 microprocessors) and software. These problems are often remedied
with "software patches"-simple programs designed to work around the
problem or otherwise remedy it-or "upgrades" that correct prior errors while
adding new features. 28 In this case, Intel determined that it would not notify
purchasers of the flaw because, in its view, the problem was unlikely to affect
ordinary users.129 Instead, the company planned to remedy the problem during
the course of its regularly scheduled product updates.130
The Pentium flaw was disclosed publicly for the first time on October
30, 1994, through a posting on the Internet. A mathematician at Lynchburg
College in Virginia, Thomas Nicely, discovered the flaw when he used his
Pentium-based computer to perform a long series of calculations in an ongoing
number theory project.13 ' When the computer generated solutions that Nicely
knew were incorrect, he spent four months determining that the flaw lay within
the Pentium chip itself. Nicely notified Intel of the problem and when he
received responses from the company that he deemed inadequate, he sent an
electronic mail over the Internet soliciting others to reproduce his results.132
After the flaw surfaced, various claims were made concerning how often
the problem might affect Pentium users. Intel claimed that wrong quotients
would be arrived at "in less than one in nine billion random divisions involving
floating point integers" and that the "flaw [could] affect only digits beyond the
thousandths place in numbers expressed in scientific notation". 33 Based on
these figures, Intel claimed that a typical spreadsheet user might come up with
wrong answers once every 27,000 years. 34 Intel concluded that "the flaw [was]
of no concern to the vast majority of users of Pentium processor based
systems."' 3 5 Because typical users had no or few occasions to employ floating
point calculations, Intel concluded that the Pentium flaw was insignificant.
However, "[a] few users of applications in the scientific/engineering and
financial engineering fields who require unusual precision and invoke millions
Barry Cipra, How Number Theory Got the Best of the Pentium Chip, SCIENCE, Jan. 13, 1995,
at 175; Gwennap, supra note 120, at 11.
128. Don Clark, Fixed Pentiums Won't Be Available Soon, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1994,
at B7; Joan E. Rigdon, Frequent Glitches in New Software Bug Users, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18,
1995, at B 1; Stephen K. Yoder, The Pentium Proposition: To Buy or Not to Buy, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 14, 1994, at B1; see also Joan E. Rigdon, Hewlett-Packard Discloses Chip Flaw in Some
of Its Workstations, Servers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1995, at B5; Intuit Confirms a Bug In
Quicken Software Tied to Capital Gains, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1995, available in Westlaw; Bart
Ziegler, IBM Temporarily Halts Production of OS/2 Warp Software Because of Bug, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 27, 1994, at B8.
129. Cipra, supra note 127, at 175.
130. Don Clark, Intel Balks at Replacing Pentium Chip Without Asking Owners Any
Questions, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 1994, at A3.
131. Cipra, supra note 127, at 175.
132. Id.
133. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 127, at 1; Stipp, supra note 123, at B6.
134. Halfhill, supra note 122, at 164.
135. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 127, at 1. Intel reasoned that:
The significance of the flaw depends upon (a) the rate of use of specific [floating
point] instructions in the Pentium CPU, (b) the data fed to them, (c) the way in
which the results of these instructions are propagated into further computation in




of divides per day may need to employ either an updated Pentium processor
without the flaw or a software workaround."136
Although initially confined to the Internet, discussion and criticism of the
Pentium flaw soon made its way into both the industry press and popular news
accounts. 137 On November 22, 1994, CNN reported on the existence of the
flaw. Although Intel continued to downplay the flaw's significance, other
reports challenged Intel's analysis and contributed to a heightening public
relations problem for Intel. Publicity concerning the flaw intensified on
December 12, 1994, when IBM suggested that Intel had significantly under-
estimated the potential frequency of Pentium errors. IBM also claimed that
more frequent errors could arise, not only in complex mathematical
calculations, but also in widely used spreadsheet applications.138 IBM claimed
an error rate of one in every 100 million, a rate that was approximately ninety
times greater than that claimed by Intel. 139 As a result, IBM announced that it
would temporarily cease shipments of all Pentium-based personal computers.t 40
IBM, it should be noted, was then selling relatively few Pentium-based
machines and had the bulk of its sales in 486-based processors.' 4' As some
industry observers noted, IBM's commercial interests could be enhanced by
slowing the Pentium adoption rate. 42
These different conclusions were not surprising because Intel and IBM
used widely different assumptions concerning the number of floating point
divisions a user would execute per day and the number of those calculations that
would involve the mistakenly empty cells in the algorithm. Perhaps the best that
could be said without conducting detailed studies was that the applicable error
rate would vary significantly depending on the particular application and would
be unlikely to affect most users. 43 Indeed, this was the thrust of Intel's own
136. Id.
137. Don Clark, Some Scientists Are Angry Over Flaw in Pentium Chip, and Intel's
Response, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1994, at B4; Gwennap, supra note 120, at 11.
138. Lewis, supra note 118, at Al; Bart Ziegler & Don Clark, Computer Giants' War
Over Flaw in Pentium Jolts the PC Industry, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1994, at Al.
139. Gwennap, supra note 120, at 11. Some observers considered IBM's estimate to be
"an extreme upper bound on the actual probability." Id. Based on this estimate, IBM asserted
that an error could arise once every 24 days. Id. This estimate of one failure per 24 days has
been challenged as "transparently fallacious." Id. See also M.L. BARTON & R.A. PASSOV,
ANALYSIS OF FLOATING POINT DIVIDE CALCULATIONS IN SPREADSHEET APPLICATIONS IN
THE COMMERCIAL PC MARKETPLACE (undated) (challenging IBM's analysis and conclusions);
INTEL CORP., INTEL'S REVIEW OF IBM'S CLAIMS, Dec. 16, 1994 (same); Thomas R. Nicely,
A Complex Problem, A Simple Solution, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 18, 1994, at B-5.
140. Ziegler & Clark, supra note 138, at Al.
141. IBM's competitors in the personal computer market relied on Pentium-based models
for a higher portion of their sales than IBM, and thus would be affected to a greater extent by
doubts concerning the chip. Id. at Al.
142. Indeed, speculation abounded that IBM's response to the Pentium controversy was
actually the result of market rivalry. IBM was trying to challenge Intel in the market for
microprocessors with the PowerPC chip, a microprocessor it had developed with Motorola Inc.
and Apple Computer Inc. Ira Sager, Bare Knuckles at Big Blue, BUS. WK., Dec. 26, 1994, at
60, 62. Indeed, when a similar problem surfaced in 1989 in Intel's 486 microprocessor, IBM
characterized the flaw as a minor problem. Stephen K. Yoder, Chip by Intel Contains Flaw in
Calculating, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1989, at A4.
143. David F. Salisbury, Problems With Pentium Found to Vary Depending on




white paper on the problem.144 Other observers studying the problem arrived
at similar conclusions, although there was some questiofiing of Intel's exact
error rate figures as well as certain portions of IBM's analysis.
According to Vaughn Pratt, a Stanford computer science professor, the
error rate could "range from as low as one in 40 billion for mathematical
operations using perfectly random numbers, to one in a few thousand for
applications that are particularly vulnerable to the bug." 45 Professor Pratt's
study demonstrated that certain users, especially those employing financial,
technological or graphics applications, might find higher levels of error rates
than those Intel arrived at by assuming random data. 46 But even in these
applications, the practical effect of the errors might vary. On the one hand, in
financial spreadsheet applications the inaccurate result was likely to appear in
insignificant decimal places. 147 In graphics programs or three-dimensional
computer games, an inaccurate calculation might cause a single pixel error that
was not likely to be noticeable. 48 On the other hand, some engineering
applications or users engaged in econometric modeling might notice errors,
particularly when those errors were compounded as a consequence of the
algorithms used in these applications.
As news of the flaw spread, Intel's response was shaped by its
engineering assessment that the flaw would have a practical effect only for a
small percentage of Pentium users. In accordance with industry practice, Intel
began to develop a "software patch" to alleviate the problem. 49 Intel also
established a telephone line for all users to request replacement chips. But
Intel's response to those requests varied depending on the nature of the
particular caller's use of the Pentium chip. Customers who called Intel were
asked a series of questions concerning how they used their computer system and
were given detailed explanations about the flaw and the infrequency of
errors.150 Those users who were engaged in a great deal of floating point work
would be provided a free replacement chip. However, Intel evaluated
replacement requests on a case-by-case basis,' 5' and the company's policy was
to convince callers who used ordinary business and consumer software that they
did not need a replacement part.152 Informally, however, Intel seemed to have
adopted a policy that they would replace the flawed Pentium chip if the
customer continued to demand replacement, regardless of the applications
used. 53
144. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 127, at 1.
145. Salisbury, supra note 143, at 5. Others opined that users who performed a large
number of floating point divisions were "virtually guaranteed to have the problem occur at least
once during the lifetime of their machines." Gwennap, supra note 120, at 11.
146. See Salisbury, supra note 143, at 5.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Intel is Developing Code to Fix Pentium Chip Flaw, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1994, at
B6; 'Patch' Planned to Bypass Flaw in Pentium, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1994, at D6 [hereinafter
'Patch' Planned].
150. Clark, supra note 137, at A3.
151. 'Patch' Planned, supra note 149, at D6.
152. Gwennap, supra note 120, at 11.
153. Clark, supra note 137, at A3; Jim Carlton, Pentium-PC Sales Hold Up Despite
Flaw, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1994, at B7.
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Intel's "need-based" replacement program was highly criticized. 154 The
essence of the criticism was that Intel's focus on the infrequency of error
caused by the Pentium flaw did not address the real problem: a loss of customer
confidence among a retail, non-technical consumer base that was quite different
from the sophisticated technical user groups affected by previous bugs.
Purchasers of Pentium-based personal computers, no matter what they used the
computers for, had understood (based in large part on Intel's own extensive
advertising campaign) that they were buying the most technologically advanced
microprocessor available. 55 When they learned of the flaw in their chip, some
customers questioned whether Intel was a quality manufacturer, especially
because at that time most customers were home and small business users who
had not been conditioned through previous purchases to expect small flaws in
new hardware and software.156 Intel compounded that problem of perception
and confidence, first, by not immediately disclosing the flaw, and, second, by
not offering to replace all defective chips. 157 Indeed, by telling customers that
their particular uses did not warrant a correctly operating chip, Intel created a
perception that it was not concerned with the expectations and anxieties of the
majority of its customers who did not run highly technical applications.15 8 As
Intel's subsequent press release acknowledged: "'To some people, this
[replacement] policy seemed arrogant and uncaring."1 59
The publicity concerning the Pentium flaw and Intel's response to that
flaw temporarily affected Intel's stock price. On October 28, 1994, the last
trading day before Professor Nicely's Internet posting disclosing the Pentium
flaw, Intel's stock closed at $62.250 per share.I6 0 On November 21, 1994, the
day before CNN announced the Pentium flaw, Intel's stock had risen to
$66.125. The next day, however, it dropped to $64.750. Shortly thereafter the
stock price began to decline again; on December 12, 1994, the day IBM
announced that it would cease shipments of Pentium-based computers, Intel's
stock closed at $60.375, and trading in the stock was temporarily halted.161 By
December 19, 1994, Intel's closing stock price had fallen to $57.813.
154. See Laurianne McLaughlin, Pentium Flaw: A Wake-Up Call?, PC WORLD, Mar.
1995, at 50.
155. Intel's Chip of Worms, ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 1994, at 65; Ross Goldstein & Bob
Kenney, Intel Learned the Hard Way, Consumers Rule, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 25, 1994, at B-
2; Jaikumar Vijayan, Intel Should Ride Out Chip Storm, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 12, 1994, at
33.
156. . Lawrence M. Fisher, Pentium Flaw Creates Confusion for PC Buyers, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1994, at Cl; McLaughlin, supra note 154, at 50; Anthony Ramirez, Doubts About the
Pentium Chip Give Intel a Marketing Problem with Few Precedents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
1994, at D18.
157. Abate, supra note 126, at B-14.
158. See Jim Carlton & Stephen K. Yoder, Humble Pie: Intel to Replace its Pentium
Chips, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1994, at B1; John Markoff, In About-Face, Intel Will Swap
Flawed Pentium Chip for Buyers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1994, at C6; Ziegler & Clark, supra
note 138, at All.
159. INTEL CORP., INTEL ADOPTS UPON-REQUEST REPLACEMENT POLICY ON
PENTIUM(TM) PROCESSORS WITH FLOATING POINT FLAW; WILL TAKE Q4 CHARGE AGAINST
EARNINGS 1 (Dec. 20, 1994) [hereinafter INTEL ADOPTS] (quoting Dr. Andrew S. Grove,
Intel's President and Chief Executive Officer).
160. These prices reflect the prices of Intel's stock prior to its announcement in April 1995
that it would split Intel's shares 2-1 on June 16, 1995 for stockholders of record as of May 19,
1995. INTEL CORP., FORM 10-Q (Filed Aug. 15, 1995); Intel is Planning a 2-for-1 Stock
Split, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1995, at 37.
161. Ziegler & Clark, supra note 138, at Al.
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On December 20, however, Intel announced a change in its official chip
replacement policy. Instead of requiring customers to demonstrate need in
order to obtain a replacement chip, Intel agreed to implement a "no-questions-
asked return policy on the current version of the Pentium processor."162 An
Intel press release on that day reiterated Intel's position that "almost no one will
ever encounter the flaw"; nonetheless, the company agreed to:
replace the processor upon request with an updated version that does
not have a flaw. This offer will be in effect for the lifetime of a user's PC,
which means that users can conclude that they do not currently want a
replacement, but still have the option of replacing the chip in the future if
they wish. Intel is making a rapid manufacturing transition to the
updated version, and expects to be able to ship sufficient replacement
parts to meet demand during the next few months. 163
Intel also disclosed that it would take "an unspecified but material charge
against fourth quarter earnings to cover costs associated with the replacement
program .... "164
Intel's stock price reacted immediately to the change in replacement
policy. On December 20, Intel's stock price increased 5.9% to $61.25. Intel's
stock price continued to rise thereafter on a fairly regular basis. It reached
levels in excess of $68.81 on each trading day following Intel's earnings press
release on January 17, 1995, in which Intel disclosed that it would take a one-
time pre-tax charge of $475 million to cover the costs of its replacement
program. 65 The recovery in Intel's stock price mirrored many industry
analysts' earlier assessments that the Pentium problem would at most have only
a temporary effect on Intel. 166 Stock market analysts also viewed the Pentium
problem as a temporary one that would not affect Intel's earnings or market
position. 167 Indeed, almost four months after the new replacement program had
been announced, estimates were that only one to three percent of consumers
(who owned roughly two-thirds of the defective Pentium chips) were seeking
replacements. 168 The low rate of returns and the subsequent demand for
Pentium-based computers also tend to support the notion that the Pentium
controversy was less about the seriousness of the defective chip and more about
Intel's perceived lack of responsiveness to its customers. 169 Intel's stock price
162. INTEL ADOPTS, supra note 159, at 1.
163. Id.
164. Id.; see infra note 165.
165. INTEL CORP., FORM 8-K (Filed Jan. 20, 1995). In the letter sent by participants in
the Forum, the earnings press release was mistakenly identified as a Form 10-Q. The letter,
however, correctly conveyed the substance of the news that was disseminated to the market and
correctly described the effect of that news on Intel's stock price.
166. Jim Carlton & Scott McCartney, Corporations Await More Information; Will
Consumers Balk?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 1994, at BI; Fisher, supra note 156, at Cl.
167. Carlton & Yoder, supra note 158, at B I; Carol Haber, Pentium Flaw Only Intel
Spoiler: Fourth Quarter Charge of $475 Million, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Jan. 23, 1995, at 1;
Robert D. Hof, Intel Takes a Bullet-And Barely Breaks Stride, Bus. WK., Jan. 30, 1995, at
38.
168. G. Christian Hill, Despite Furor, Most Keep Their Pentium Chips, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 13, 1995, at B 1. About 25% of corporate users sought replacement. Id.
169. Id.; Don Clark, Intel Posts 44% Rise in 1st-Period Profit on Record Revenue From
Pentium Chip, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1995, at A3.
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movements supported these assessments and, after disclosure of the Pentium-
related reserves, Intel's stock price continued to climb. 70
In summary, there are six significant points these facts reveal that are
necessary for an understanding of the merits of the class action and derivative
litigation that the Pentium controversy spawned. First, the Pentium flaw was a
relatively minor technical problem that likely had a practical impact on
relatively few Pentium users, although reasonable mathematicians could differ
over the incidence and import of the flaw. Second, software and hardware
flaws have been commonplace in the computer industry for years, yet none of
those flaws had apparently ever caused major stock market consequences
comparable to those resulting from Pentium-related disclosures. Intel thus had a
reasonable basis to be surprised by the consequences of this particular flaw.
Third, Intel's initial plan to remedy the flaw in its next round of production
was consistent with Intel's past practices and with much industry practice.
Fourth, the ensuing furor over the Pentium flaw, although significant, was
essentially a public relations problem, rather than a problem that affected
Intel's underlying fundamentals or future prospects. Fifth, the Pentium
controversy did not cause any permanent decline in Intel's stock price. Rather,
the temporary effect on Intel's stock price seemed to be the result of a
transitory dissatisfaction with Intel's replacement policy. The stock price effect
dissipated as soon as Intel altered its policy. Sixth, and perhaps most'significant,
there was good reason to believe that Intel had made an honest engineering and
customer relations mistake, and mistakes of this sort should not be confused
with fraud. Indeed, Intel had run billions of tests in search of errors such as the
one that had cropped up. It instituted a corrective policy that was standard for
the industry at the time, and that had effectively dealt with prior flaws that
were arguably more serious from a technological perspective. The market itself
quickly disciplined Intel to change its customer relations policy and, under these
circumstances, there was substantial doubt that a legitimate social or investor
interest could be vindicated by protracted, complex, and expensive litigation
alleging fraud.
Not surprisingly, the widespread publicity surrounding the Pentium flaw
resulted in the filing of shareholder class action litigation, as well as a
derivative action and consumer class actions. The Pentium flaw was not unique
in its ability to generate a "three-ring circus" of this kind. The announcement of
adverse news, such as the existence of an investigation or, like Intel, the
disclosure of a product defect, will often lead to consumer, antitrust or criminal
actions and corresponding securities fraud and derivative claims.17' In these
170. By July 17, 1995, Intel's stock had climbed to a high closing price of $78.375, on a
post-split basis. At that point, Intel's stock price began to decline, finally reaching a closing price
of $58.688 on October 4, 1995. After temporarily increasing to $72.875 on November 2, 1995,
Intel's stock price dropped, along with most other stocks in the high-technology sector, closing
at $51.000 on January 18, 1996. See infra App. A; Don Clark, Intel Confirms Investors'
Worries, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1996, at A3 (noting that company's earnings were below
analysts' estimates because company purchased too many memory chips, not from any
continuing effects from Pentium problem); Charles McCoy & G. Christian Hill, Sinking Chips:
Tech Stocks' Decline May Be Overreaction, But Problems Are Real, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11,
1996, at Al.
171. An example of this type of proliferating litigation is the situation where a "piggyback"
derivative action is filed after a securities class action has been commenced. These derivative
actions typically allege, in part, that the company's officers and directors have violated their
fiduciary duties by exposing the company to litigation expenses and potential liability in the
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situations, a multiplicity of legal theories are typically asserted on behalf of
different, but overlapping, constituencies.
B. The Shareholder Class Action Complaint
The first shareholder class litigation based on the Pentium chip flaw,
Whitaker v. Moore,172 was filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California on December 12, 1994, the same day that IBM
announced that it would stop shipping Pentium-based personal computers. The
complaint in Whitaker asserted class action securities fraud claims against Intel
and certain of its senior directors and executives on behalf of all persons who
purchased common stock or warrants of Intel Corporation between January 1,
1994, and December 9, 1994. The seven representative plaintiffs in the action
each purchased between 100 and 1,000 shares during the class period alleged in
the complaint. The Whitaker complaint alleged that: (i) Intel deceived investors
by failing to disclose a known flaw in certain floating point calculations
performed by Intel's Pentium chip; (ii) this deception caused class members to
purchase Intel shares at artificially inflated prices; and (iii) certain Intel insiders
sold stock at these inflated prices. The shareholder class action also alleged that
Intel insiders perpetrated the fraud to protect and enhance their executive
positions and prestige, as well as to enhance the value of their Intel stock
holdings and options.
C. The Derivative Action
On December 21, 1994, a derivative action entitled Gunther v. Moore
was commenced in federal court in the Northern District of California.173 The
Gunther complaint alleged facts essentially identical to those stated in Whitaker,
except that it recast the alleged harm as being to the corporation rather than to
the shareholders. The Gunther complaint alleged that: (i) Intel's directors and
officers breached their fiduciary duties owed to the corporation to assure that
the Pentium chip was marketed, tested, and developed with the appropriate
degree of internal controls; (ii) Intel breached its fiduciary duties by falsely
concealing the Pentium flaw; and (iii) Intel's directors and officers had an
incentive to conceal the flaw so as to enhance their bonus compensation and to
profit from the same stock sales alleged in the Whitaker complaint. The
Gunther complaint relied on the decline in Intel's stock price as evidence of the
harm caused by these alleged breaches. The complaint also asserted that the
corporation was damaged as a result of the costs imposed by the class action
shareholders' litigation and the consumer class action product liability claims,
described below. Finally, the complaint alleged harm to Intel's reputation, and
further damage as a consequence of the need to establish a reserve to cover the
costs of Irltel's chip replacement program.
securities class action. See, e.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 852 F. Supp. 1437 (N.D. Cal. 1994);
see also Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2, at 2072-74 (describing the Oracle litigation); Scott
Kilman, Archer 10-K Filing Shows 28 Lawsuits By Shareholders, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18,
1995, at B2 (noting that shareholder and derivative actions were filed against Archer-Daniels-
Midland Co. in the wake of a grand jury investigation of price-fixing allegations); Scott Kilman,
ADM Faces More Than 85 Suits Linked to Disclosure of Price-Fixing Inquiry, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 15, 1996, at B10.
172. Whitaker v. Moore, Civ. No. 94-20855 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 12, 1994).
173. Gunther v. Moore, Civ. No. 94-20878 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 21, 1994).
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D. The Consumer Class Action
The consumer class actions 174 alleged that from at least June 1994
through November 1994, Intel knowingly manufactured, marketed, and sold
more than two million defective Pentium chips.175 The consolidated complaint
in the class action alleged that Intel failed to warn users of the defect during
that time period, that Intel extensively advertised the Pentium chip as the most
powerful and reliable microprocessor on the market, and that although Intel
knew that correction of the flaw would require replacing the defective chip, it
improperly concealed the magnitude of the flaw. 176 The consolidated class
action complaint also alleged that prior to the initiation of the consumer class
actions, Intel "took no effective affirmative action to either correct or replace
the defective Pentium® processors it had manufactured, marketed and sold to
the general public."'177 Based on these allegations, Intel allegedly committed
unlawful, unfair and fraudulent business practices, engaged in false and
misleading advertising, and violated the consumer protection acts of various
states.178 Those actions also asserted claims for fraud, breach of warranty,
negligence, and products liability.179
V. THE PENTIUM LETTER AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN THE
SHAREHOLDER AND DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
In accordance with the strategy agreed to among the four institutional
investors who participated in the Pentium initiative, a letter (the "Pentium
Letter") was sent to all counsel in the shareholder and derivative actions
explaining the basis for the institutional investors' concerns that those actions
may have lacked merit.180
The Pentium Letter raised three distinct concerns regarding the merits of
the Whitaker shareholder class action. First, Intel's stock price behavior
appeared to be inconsistent with the theory alleged in the complaint.'18 The
Pentium Letter noted that the Whitaker complaint was premised on the theory
that Intel's failure to disclose the Pentium flaw artificially inflated the price of
Intel's shares.18 2 If the class action theory were correct, then the price of Intel's
stock would have suffered a material decline after disclosure of the problem
174. Consumer class actions were filed in federal court in Colorado (Data Technology
Servs. v. Intel, No. 94-N-2886 (D. Colo. 1994)), and in the state courts in California, Illinois(Machtinger v. Intel, No. 94-C-7300 (Cook County Cir. Ct. 1994)), Michigan (Representative
Elec. Prods. v. Intel, 94-435132CK (Wayne County Super. Ct. 1994)), and New Jersey (Lees
v. Intel, No. L 11508 94 (Camden County Super. Ct. 1994)). The California actions were
consolidated for pre-trial purposes in the Superior Court for Santa Clara County. See In re Intel
Pentium Processor Litig., Master File No. CV 745729 [hereinafter Pentium Processor Litig.]. A
global settlement of the consumer class actions was also entered in the California consolidated
actions. Pentium Processor Litig., Notice of Decision on Class Counsel's Application for an
Award of Attorneys' Fees, at 2 (Dec. 27, 1995).





180. Letter from Joseph A. Grundfest, Professsor of Law, Stanford Law School, and
others, to Plaintiff and Defense Counsel, Whittaker v. Moore and Gunther v. Moore (Feb. 8,
1995) (see infra App. A at 605-26) [hereinafter Pentium Letter].
181. See id., infra App. A, at 609-11.
182. See id., infra App. A, at 609.
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and would not have recovered after adoption of a "no-questions-asked" return
policy. The data revealed no such permanent decline, and quite inconsistent
with the theory of fraud, the data demonstrated that a sharp increase in the
stock price occurred after the change in policy. Indeed, the stock price
continued to rise on a fairly regular basis through the date on which the
Pentium Letter was drafted. 83
In accordance with the institutional investors' agreed upon strategy, the
Pentium Letter demonstrated the basis for this result in significant detail. A
table listed the daily closing price of Intel's shares from the beginning of the
class period through the most recent date for which data were available. 8 4
Charts depicted the stock movements for that entire period and the stock
movements in response to the first disclosure of the Pentium flaw and other
significant disclosures relating to the problem.185 The Pentium Letter also
explained the conclusion the institutional investors drew from this data-that
the stock market impact of the Pentium flaw was transitory. This effect was
called the "transitory Pentium value gap" and it was apparent only during the
period immediately preceding Intel's December 20, 1994 change in its chip
replacement policy. 86 The Pentium Letter included a statistical analysis of the
significance of Intel's stock price movements that bolstered this conclusion. 87
As a result, the Pentium Letter concluded that "the transitory nature of
the Pentium value gap is consistent with an alternative explanation of Intel's
stock price performance that is unrelated to securities fraud." 8 8 This
alternative explanation was tied to Intel's institution of a "need-based" customer
return policy which, given the timing of the temporary decline in Intel's stock
price, appeared to be a necessary condition for the Pentium-related price
decline. 89 Once that policy was changed to a "no-questions asked" policy,
Intel's stock price returned to the higher levels that had been prevailing before
disclosure of the Pentium flaw. This pattern, the letter concluded, was
consistent with the notion that Intel had been truthful throughout and that the
market was simply responding to customer's concerns over Intel's customer
relations policy. 90 Once the new replacement policy eliminated those concerns,
the market effect dissipated. Intel's stock price performance was consequently
not necessarily the result of fraud and, at a minimum, plaintiffs' theory
suffered from a significant causation problem.' 9'
Second, the Pentium Letter questioned whether the insider sales alleged
in the complaint supported an inference offraud. Here, the Pentium Letter
simply pointed out that the sales alleged in the Whitaker complaint were
executed at prices from $57.50 to $63.11 per share, although Intel's stock price
had remained above $63.11 per share on every trading day between December
29, 1994, and the date of the letter. 92 These facts, the Pentium Letter noted,
183. See id., infra App. A, at 610-11.
184. See id., infra App. A, at 616-17 (Tbl. 1).
185. See id., infra App. A, at 618-19 (Figs. 1 & 2).
186. See id., infra App. A, at 610.
187. See id., infra App. A, at 620-22 (Exhibit A).
188. See id., infra App. A, at 611.
189. See id., infra App. A, at 611.
190. See id., infra App. A, at 611.
191. See id., infra App. A, at 611.
192. See id., infra App. A, at 611.
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did not support the conclusion that the Intel insiders thought Intel's price was
inflated because each of these sellers would have been better off had they held
their Intel shares through the disclosure of the Pentium flaw and through the
resolution of the subsequent Pentium-related events. 193
Finally, the Pentium Letter noted that flaws in computer software and
hardware were not unusual and that they had generally been resolved without
major stock market consequences.1 94 The Whitaker complaint failed to allege
any basis upon which Intel's officers and directors knew or had reason to know
that the Pentium flaw would differ from those earlier cases. 195 Although the
Whitaker complaint alleged that Intel knew of the Pentium flaw before it was
disclosed to the market, the complaint did not allege any facts supporting the
inference that Intel knew or had reason to know that disclosure of the Pentium
flaw would have a material adverse effect on the price of Intel's stock or on
Intel's financial performance.t 96 To the contrary, product flaws are not rare in
the computer industry, and none, as far as the institutional investors were
aware, had caused a market response comparable to news of the Pentium
flaw.197 As a result, the institutional investors questioned whether the market
consequences of the Pentium flaw were reasonably foreseeable to Intel's
management.1 98 If not, then there seemed to be no reason to believe that
management knew it was engaged in securities fraud. Rather, under these
circumstances, a material concern existed as to whether the Whitaker complaint
merely alleged "fraud by hindsight."199
The Pentium Letter next addressed the Gunther derivative complaint.200
Many of the institutional investors' concerns with respect to the derivative
action mirrored the concerns expressed about the shareholder class action. As
with the shareholder action, Intel's stock price performance did not support an
inference of fraud in the derivative action. Because the Pentium controversy
only had a temporary effect on Intel's stock price, the stock price data did not
support the inference that the actions of Intel's executives had caused a
permanent decline in the value of the corporation's equity. The Pentium Letter
also pointed out that the Gunther complaint failed to articulate any basis from
which one could conclude that Intel's management knew or had reason to know
that the Pentium flaw would have such a significant market impact.201 Without
a basis for such foresight, the institutional investors concluded that the Gunther
193. See id., infra App. A, at 612.
194. See id., infra App. A, at 612.
195. See id., infra App. A, at 612.
196. The Ninth Circuit had rejected the pleading requirement enunciated in the Second
Circuit that required plaintiffs to allege facts giving rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent,
although the Ninth Circuit did require that the complaint allege "with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud." In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1545-47 (9th
Cir. 1994) (en banc) (refusing to follow O'Brien v. National Property Analysts Partners, 936
F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1991) and Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980)). The 1995 Reform Act, however, reverses GlenFed because it
requires the complaint to "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind." 1934 Act, § 21D(b)(2), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(109 Stat.) 737, 744.
197. See Pentium Letter, infra App. A, at 612.
198. See id., infra App. A, at 612.
199. See id., infra App. A, at 612.
200. See id., infra App. A, at 613-14.
201. See id., infra App. A, at 613.
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complaint may merely have alleged an insupportable claim for
"mismanagement by hindsight."202
The institutional investors next addressed the claim in Gunther that Intel's
management breached their fiduciary duties because their conduct precipitated
the filing of various class action suits. The Pentium Letter suggested that this
claim was without foundation and constituted a bootstrap because, as previously
discussed, the securities class actions themselves lacked merit.203 Finally, the
Pentium Letter suggested that the alleged damage to Intel's reputation was
"questionable."20 4 No other manufacturer, at least as far as the institutional
investors were aware, had demonstrated a willingness or ability to undertake a
replacement program of the scope or magnitude of that commenced by Intel,
and such a replacement program could only enhance Intel's reputation among
consumers. Moreover, Intel's stock price performance following the
announcement of the replacement program appeared to contradict any
permanent loss of reputation.205
The Pentium Letter concluded with the observation that weak private
class action securities claims "can impose substantial and unnecessary costs on
publicly traded firms that are forced to defend against such actions." 206 Similar
concerns were raised with respect to derivative actions that merely "piggyback"
on previously filed securities fraud complaints. Those derivative actions
"compound the public policy concern over the costs imposed by unwarranted
litigation." 207 As a result, the institutional investors requested counsel in the
Gunther and Whitaker actions to "reconsider the prudence of their stated
claims." 208 The institutional investors acknowledged that if plaintiffs counsel
could allege more substantial facts than currently appeared in the record, then
their view of the merits might change. The current record, however, suggested
that the actions seemed to be "clear examples of the sort of litigation that can do
more harm than good and that do not promote the interests of the very
investors on whose behalf the claims are ostensibly filed."209
After the Pentium Letter was drafted, the course of the Gunther and
Whitaker actions changed dramatically. In the shareholder class action,
plaintiff's lead counsel voluntarily dismissed the action the day before they
learned of the Pentium Letter. The institutional investors cannot claim that their
letter caused the dismissal. Nonetheless, the dismissal is significant because it
demonstrates that institutional investors can identify claims that are so weak that
they should be dismissed even by plaintiff counsel's own concession. This result
may at least partially blunt any potential criticism that institutions are incapable
of identifying weak class actions.
In Gunther, the institutional investors learned after drafting the Pentium
Letter that counsel in the derivative action had initiated discussions regarding
potential dismissal of the derivative claims. Plaintiffs counsel was then
contacted, and he maintained that the derivative action alleged viable claims for
202. See id., infra App. A, at 613.
203. See id., infra App. A, at 613.
204. See id., infra App. A, at 614.
205. See id., infra App. A, at 614.
206. See id., infra App. A, at 614.
207. See id., infra App. A, at 614.
208. See id., infra App. A, at 614.
209. See id., infra App. A, at 614.
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relief. A prerelease version of the Pentium Letter was faxed to plaintiff's
counsel to explain more fully the institutional investors' concerns about the
merits of the Gunther action. Ninety minutes later, the institutional investors
were informed that plaintiffs counsel had agreed in principle to stipulate to a
dismissal of the derivative action as moot. Plaintiffs counsel claimed, however,
that the decision to dismiss was not caused by the Pentium Letter.
VI. THE FORUM'S PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSUMER
CLASS ACTION
The institutional investor signatories to the Pentium Letter were also
purchasers of more than 500 computers with Pentium processors. The
institutional investors were thus members of the consumer class actions, as well
as members of the shareholder class action. 210 Thus, to the extent that a socially
optimal resolution of the Pentium dispute would also take into account the
interest of Pentium consumers, the institutional investors were well-situated to
express that perspective as well. As noted above, in the Pentium Letter, the
institutions opined that they believed the consumer class actions lacked merit
because Intel had already determined to replace any customer's Pentium chip on
a "no-questions-asked" basis.21 Despite Intel's agreement, the consumer class
actions were not voluntarily dismissed as the Gunther and Whitaker actions had
been; rather, counsel in the consumer cases negotiated a settlement for which
they sought court approval.
The terms of the consumer class action settlement were quite similar to
the actions Intel had undertaken on its own initiative. The settlement provided
that Intel would implement a no-questions-asked replacement program and
would issue a written guarantee for all class members who decided to replace
their Pentium chips at a later date.212 Intel agreed to provide a software
program that would identify whether a Pentium chip contained the defect, as
well as to notify class members of the availability of that program and of the
existence of the replacement program.2 13 Intel agreed to maintain local service
centers (which it had already established) and a toll-free telephone number to
assist class members in replacing their chips. 214 Finally, Intel agreed to
210. The Pentium action was unusual in this sense because it will not often be that
institutional investors will have such a direct stake in all of the actions pending against a
company that derive out of a common fact pattern. Indeed, with respect to the Pentium consumer
class action, the institutions may have had a greater interest than some other class members
because they used their computers for some of the high-end functions that were most affected by
the flawed Pentium chip. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
211. INTEL ADOPTS, supra note 159, at 1 (quoting Dr. Andrew S. Grove, Intel's
President and Chief Executive Officer).
212. Pentium Processor Litig., Stipulation of Settlement at Exhibit A, at 2 (Mar. 20,
1995) ("Intel will exchange within a reasonable time the current version of the Pentium®
processor for an updated version, in which the FPU Imperfection is corrected, for any
Settlement Class Member who requests it, free of charge anytime during the life of their
computer.") In comparison, Intel announced on December 21, 1994 that it would: "replace the
processor upon request with an updated version that does not have the flaw. This offer will be in
effect for the lifetime of a user's PC, which means that users can conclude they do not currently
want a replacement, but still have the option of replacing the chip in the future if they wish."
INTEL ADOPTS, supra note 159, at 1.
213. Pentium Processor Litig., Stipulation of Settlement at Exhibit A, at 1 (Mar. 20,
1995).
214. Id. at Exhibit A, at 2.
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implement what amounted to an arbitration procedure for resolving possible
claims for consequential or economic damages "attributable to the [Floating
Point Unit] imperfection" in the Pentium chip.2 15 In connection with this
settlement, plaintiff's counsel sought an award of attorneys' fees and
disbursement of expenses of up to $6 million,2 16 which Intel agreed it would
not oppose.217
After reviewing these terms, the institutional investors who authorized
the Pentium Letter determined that they would support the settlement but
oppose the attorneys' fees. This determination was based on a number of
considerations. First, the institutional investors believed that there was little or
no causal link between the terms of the settlement and the effort that plaintiff's
counsel expended; rather, it seemed that market forces would have compelled
Intel to take the steps it did, or materially equivalent steps, regardless of
whether or not the consumer class actions had been filed. Subsequent events
tend to support this view. In particular, Intel has now instituted policies (none
of which were compelled by the class action settlement) that provide additional
safeguards against the presence of flaws in its microprocessors over and above
the safeguards mandated by the settlement. For example, Intel prereleased its
next generation of microprocessor, the P6, to various computer users who
tested it under real-world conditions before Intel shipped the chip in high
volumes to customers.2 18 Intel continues to disclose flaws and other similar
types of problems in other chips, without the compulsion of any court
judgment.219 Although plaintiff's class action attorneys may argue that there is a
benefit to being legally bound to undertake certain actions, the marginal benefit
of such a requirement seems small when the company has already publicly
committed to take the specified actions, and when market forces independently
compel such an outcome.
Moreover, the other terms of the settlement, specifically the arbitration
procedure for consequential damages, were questionable as justification for an
award of $6 million in attorneys' fees. Such a procedure would appear to
benefit Intel as much as the class members because it gives Intel the ability to
consolidate all such claims and removes the potential for excessive jury awards.
Also, because Intel would rationally agree to such a dispute resolution
mechanism for all consumers claiming consequential damages, the litigation
cannot be said to have effectively induced Intel to accept this dispute resolution
mechanism. As a result, the benefit of the settlement for the class is, at best,
highly speculative because it is questionable that the consumer class action
generated any benefit that would not have been forthcoming in any event.
Despite these concerns, the institutional investors did not file objections
to the requested attorneys' fees. This decision was based, in large part, on a
215. l, at Exhibit B, at 1.
216. Pentium Processor Litig., Notice of Decision on Class Counsel's application for an
Award of Attorneys' Fees, at 2 (Dec. 27, 1995).
217. Pentium Processor Litig., Stipulation of Settlement, at 14-15.
218. Intel Plans to Test New Chip with Users, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1995, at D8.
219. See Ralph T. King, Jr., Intel Confirms It Overstated Speed of Pentium Chips, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 8, 1996, at B2. The idea that these efforts were compelled by market forces rather
than the presence of the class action is also supported by the fact that other computer companies
have undertaken similar efforts. See Netscape Awards Bounties to Successful Bug Hunters,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1995, at B7.
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request from senior Intel executives who asked that Intel just be allowed to put
the Pentium matter behind it. The institutions deferred to Intel's management
on this point because of the institutions' perception that management had
operated the company well in the past and that the management of a well-
performing, competently governed corporation deserved a degree of
deference. 220 Other class members did, however, object to the proposed
attorneys' fees.221
On June 22, 1995, the court approved the proposed settlement. 222 On
December 27, 1995, the court approved a fee award of $4,272,969 to class
counsel in the consumer actions. 223 Although this fee award was less than the
six million dollars class counsel had requested, the court's analysis of the fee
issue still failed to consider some of the concerns the institutions would have
raised. In particular, the court applied the lodestar method for determining the
class action fee,224 and adjusted- the lodestar amount upward by a factor of
three, based in part on its determination that counsel's ability to obtain an early
settlement of the action conferred a substantial benefit on the class.225 This
determination seemingly ignores the fact that Intel had already agreed to
undertake the majority of the obligations under the settlement. As a result,
entering into a settlement to do that which it had already publicly undertaken to
do presented no serious impediment to Intel. Rather than serving as a basis for
multiplying the fees class action counsel sought, the early settlement in the
consumer cases may instead indicate the small benefit that counsel conferred on
the class.
220. Some plaintiffs' class action counsel have suggested that this willingness to accede in
one case to management's wishes demonstrates that institutions are "too close" to management to
operate as appropriate litigation monitors. As a preliminary matter, this argument seems
somewhat disingenuous because if the Forum participants formally objected to the proposed
attorneys' fees, then plaintiff's class counsel would have likely opposed these objections as
unwarranted, and would likely have criticized the Forum participants as "pro-management" for
asserting those objections. In other words, this was a classic "heads-I-win, tails-you-lose"
situation in which institutional investors can avoid criticism from plaintiffs counsel only by
allowing plaintiff's counsel to have their way without any objections from institutional investors.
More importantly, the conclusion that institutions may be "too close" to management is
contradicted by the Forum participants' inclination to pursue, in appropriate cases, settlements
structured so that culpable individual officers or directors, rather than the corporation, pay the
majority of the settlement. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text. This approach,
which seeks a higher level of deterrence for improper actions, is not indicative of being "too
close" to management. Finally, institutions have already demonstrated their independence in
corporate governance activism, and there is no reason they cannot be similarly independent in the
litigation context. See generally Grundfest, supra note 12.
221. See Pentium Processor Litig., Notice of Objection and of Intention to Appear
Through Counsel at Fairness Hearing to Object to Proposed Settlement and Award of Attorneys'
Fees, and Request to Meet and Confer; Declaration of Lawrence W. Schonbrun in Support
Thereof (June 22, 1995).
222. See Pentium Processor Litig., Notice of Decision on Class Counsel's Application for
an Award of Attorneys' Fees, at 2.
223. Id. at 5.
224. Id. at 3. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
lodestar method.
225. Pentium Processor Litig., Notice of Decision of Class Counsel's Application for an
Award of Attorneys' Fees, at 4.
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VII. LESSONS LEARNED AND OBSERVATIONS
The activities of the Forum participants to date,2 26 although not
extensive, suggest some preliminary conclusions concerning the nature of and
potential for collective institutional shareholder action in class and derivative
actions. First, collective action problems can be addressed without having any
investor assume lead plaintiff status, at least in a subset of class action situations.
The class actions in which individual initiatives may be successful likely fall
226. In October 1995, eight institutional investors who have participated in the Forum,
and who manage more than $610 billion in assets, sent a letter to Judge Vaughn Walker, who
was evaluating a settlement in the California Micro Devices Securities Litigation. Those
institutions expressed their support for Judge Walker's decisions: (i) to require competitive
bidding as a mechanism for selecting class counsel; and (ii) to require counsel urging approval of
a settlement to "make a showing that the proposed settlement and accompanying attorney fee
award enjoys affirmative support, as opposed to silent toleration, of a significant portion of the
prospective class." In re California Micro Devices See. Litig., No. C-94-2817-VRW, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11587, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1995). Although the institutions supported
these initiatives, they expressed concerns about the exact manner in which counsel solicited the
views of the class, about the reliability of the responses received, and about the substantive
terms of the settlement. Despite these concerns, the institutions suggested that the most
pragmatic course available to the court may be to approve the settlement. The institutions
suggested, however, that the court consider modifying the requested attorneys' fee to provide a
more modest fee in connection with the settlement, but to allow for the potential of additional
future fees as an incentive for the attorneys to pursue parties who may have engaged in culpable
conduct.
In response to these concerns, Judge Walker denied preliminary approval of the
settlement, refused to appoint as lead plaintiffs' counsel the plaintiffs' law firm that was urging
settlement, and appointed instead an institutional investor, the Colorado Public Employees'
Retirement Association, as class representative. In re California Micro Devices Sec. Litig., No.
C-94-2817-VRW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1361, at *3, *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 1996). In so
holding, Judge Walker praised the institutional investors' "cogent observations and criticisms of
both the proposed settlement and the manner in which that settlement was reached." IaM at *31.
The institutional investors' input was "invaluable in assessing the true value of [the] settlement."
Id. at *56. Indeed, Judge Walker's opinion closely tracks and quotes extensively from the letter
sent by the Forum participants and other institutional investors.
In particular, Judge Walker found that the polling procedure used to survey the class was
inadequate based on, among other things, deficiencies in the polling letter that the institutional
investors pointed out. Id. at *24-*30. Judge Walker found that the settlement had "so many
troubling aspects that the court [wa]s forced to conclude that it was negotiated under quasi-
collusive circumstances." Id. at *34. Again, the inadequacies of the settlement were those the
institutional investors highlighted: (i) the small cash component of the settlement, especially in
light of the failure of plaintiffs' counsel to assess critically whether the company was on the
verge of bankruptcy, as it claimed; (ii) the release of outside directors from liability without
requiring them to contribute any consideration to the settlement; (iii) the high level of attorneys'
fees; and (iv) the dilutive effects of the settlement structure, which required the company to issue
new stock to class members. Id. at *32-*53.
From a procedural perspective, Judge Walker's decision was interesting for its use of
precedents holding that an attorney may not serve both as class counsel and class representative.
Id. at *4, *54-*55 (citing Shroder v. Suburban Coastal Corp., 729 F.2d 1371, 1375 (11th Cir.
1984); Lowenschuss v. Bluhdorn, 613 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1980); Zylstra v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1978); Susman v. Lincoln American Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 90-
92 (7th Cir. 1977); Turoff v. May Co., 531 F.2d 1357, 1360 (6th Cir. 1976)). Instead of
merely noting that in most shareholder class litigation representative plaintiffs serve merely as
figureheads, Judge Walker used these precedents to hold that "[w]hen class counsel are not
effectively monitored by the class representative, the result is indistinguishable from the situation
in which an attorney serves" as both counsel and representative plaintiff. Id. at *4. Because the
named plaintiffs had demonstrated their inability to monitor and control counsel, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4). Id. at *55. The
court found that in the California Micro Devices case, the only plaintiff that could provide such
effective monitoring would be an institutional investor. Id. at *55-*59.
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within a window of opportunity in which individual claimants have claims or
portfolios sufficiently large to justify individual action or to generate
substantial positive portfolio effects as a result of such initiatives. If claims or
portfolio effects are too small, then individual action may not be cost effective
and collective action problems are likely to predominate. If claims or portfolio
effects are too large, then the most cost effective strategy for individuals may
be to opt out of the class action.
Second, the Forum's experience in the Pentium litigation strongly
suggests that low-cost approaches to institutional shareholder action can be
effective, if properly structured. The institutional investors expected, and their
later experience demonstrated, that low-cost strategies like writing letters to
counsel, as opposed to assuming the role of lead plaintiff or challenging
settlements, can work if the institutions' concerns are carefully researched and
well-documented. In certain situations, depending on the size of the institutional
investor's potential claim or the expected benefits to be derived from positive
portfolio effects, such low-cost strategies may be the only cost effective
strategies available to address collective action problems. The creation and
implementation of effective, low-cost strategies may thereby widen the window
of opportunity for addressing collective action problems because these
strategies may still be cost effective even where claims or portfolio effects are
not as significant.
The prospect for future successes for the Forum or other institutional
initiatives is, however, uncertain. The 1995 Reform Act 227 may have an impact
on these types of initiatives, although assessing the exact nature of that impact is
difficult. On the one hand, the legislation clearly contemplates an increased
participatory role for institutional investors. In passing the Act, Congress
recognized the presence of agency and collective action problems. 228 Its
solution to those problems was the one identified by Professors Weiss and
Beckerman-protecting "investors who join class actions against lawyer-driven
lawsuits by giving control of the litigation to lead plaintiffs with substantial
holdings of the securities of the issuer."229 Under the proposed statute, any
member of the class may seek to be named lead plaintiff, defined to be the
member "of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most
capable of adequately representing the interests of class members." 230 The Act
requires courts to adopt a presumption that the "most adequate plaintiff' is the
class member that, among other things, the court determines to have "the
largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class." 231 This standard was
227. Act of Dec. 22, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat) 737.
228. The legislative history indicates that the House and Senate Committees heard
evidence concerning "the manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom they
purportedly represent." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 369, supra note 7, at 31, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 730.
229. Id. at 32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 731. The legislative history opines
that the interests of plaintiffs with substantial holdings "are more strongly aligned with the class
of shareholders." Id. It was hoped that these investors would "participate in the litigation and
exercise control over the selection and actions of plaintiffs' counsel." Id.
230. 1933 Act, § 27(a)(3)(B)(i), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 739; 1934 Act, §
21D(a)(3)(B)(i), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 744.
231. 1933 Act, § 27(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), (1)(bb), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 739;
1934 Act, § 21D(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), (I)(bb), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 744. The other
requirements for most adequate plaintiff status are that the person under consideration has filed
the complaint or made a motion to be named lead plaintiff and that she otherwise satisfy the
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specifically designed to "increase the likelihood that institutional investors will
serve as lead plaintiffs."232 Thus, if institutional investors seek to become lead
plaintiffs they should have significant opportunities to do so. 233
Increasing the presence of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs would
likely ameliorate at least some of the problems that currently exist in securities
class action litigation. What remains to be seen, however, is whether institutions
will be willing to step forward and accept the mantle of lead plaintiff in
anything but rare cases. Nothing in the statute requires them to do so, and the
rebuttable presumption concerning the most adequate plaintiff applies only to
those class members who filed the complaint or who moved to be named lead
plaintiff.234 Thus, if the institutions fail to volunteer to serve as lead plaintiff,
the court does not have power under the statute to compel them to become lead
plaintiff.
There are a number of reasons why institutions may choose, in the vast
majority of cases, neither to file a complaint nor make a motion, thereby
eliminating themselves from the competition for the lead plaintiff spot. As
earlier suggested, the lead plaintiff role may represent a high cost strategy that
institutions may find is unnecessary to achieve the positive benefits associated
with institutional activism. Seeking the lead plaintiff spot may entail substantial
costs. To the extent that institutions do in fact seek the lead plaintiff spot,
considerable funds may be spent and time devoted to litigating who is the most
adequate plaintiff, particularly in the early years of the statute's application.
This is so because under the 1995 Reform Act, the lead plaintiff, subject to
court approval, chooses lead counsel.235 Currently, the lead counsel position is
quite lucrative and the plaintiff's class action counsel have a significant interest
in obtaining that spot.236 There is no reason to believe that the lead counsel
position will be any less lucrative under the 1995 Reform Act unless the
introduction of lead plaintiffs who assert active monitoring roles also causes
increased price competition for the right to represent a class. Therefore it
seems likely that competitors will continue to devote considerable effort and
make significant expenditures to capture the lead counsel position, particularly
in the first cases litigated under the new regime where the exact application of
requirements of Rule 23. 1933 Act, § 27(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(aa), (cc), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109
Stat.) 737, 739; 1934 Act, § 21D(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(aa), (cc), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.)
737, 744.
232. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 369, supra note 7, at 34, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
679, 733 (citing Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2).
233. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2, at 2056 nn.9, 10 (referring to studies
estimating that institutions own over 50% of public and private equity securities and account for
approximately 70% of the daily trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange). Indeed, one
example of a possible opportunity that might have been open to institutions interested in
becoming lead plaintiffs involves the action commenced against Silicon Graphics and certain of
its officers and directors-one of the first class action complaints filed under the terms of the
new 1995 Reform Act. Brody v. McCracken, Civ. No. 96-0393 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 1996).
Although the exact composition of the class is not entirely clear, some evidence indicates that
institutional investors may be among the largest class members. As of June 30, 1995,
institutions held 72.8% of Silicon Graphics outstanding stock. CDA/Spectrum, 13(f)
Institutional Stock Holdings 1290 (June 30, 1995).
234. 1933 Act, § 27(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(aa), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 739; 1934
Act, § 21D(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(aa), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 744.
235. 1933 Act, § 27(a)(3)(B)(v), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 740; 1934 Act, §
21D(a)(3)(B)(v), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 745.
236. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 693 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
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the Act will still be unclear. The only thing that is likely to change is the form
that this competition takes.
Under the old regime, competition often centered around filing the first
class action complaint, because the attorney filing that complaint was perceived
to have a comparative advantage in obtaining the lead counsel's role.237
Congress sought to eliminate this "race to the courthouse" in a number of ways.
First, under the Act, the plaintiffs in the first filed action are required to
publish a notice "in a widely circulated national business-oriented publication or
wire service" that alerts potential class members to the filing of the suit, the
claims asserted therein, and that any member of the class, no later than sixty
days after the notice, may move to be named lead plaintiff.238 In a typical
contingency case, the attorney will have to bear these costs as an initial
matter.239 Second, the priority in which a complaint was filed was eliminated as
a factor in determining the lead plaintiff who will choose the lead counsel.240
These provisions may actually create a slight first-mover disadvantage because
the first to file will have to bear the costs of notice and will receive no benefit
for filing first. It is reasonable to expect that these provisions will inhibit, at
least somewhat, the race to the courthouse. Preliminary anecdotal evidence
supports this conclusion. 241
Curbing the race to the courthouse, however, does not necessarily mean
that the competition for the lead counsel role will also be curbed. Take for
example a situation where an institution determines that it will seek the lead
plaintiff role but also determines that it will, if named lead plaintiff, select lead
counsel from outside the ranks of traditional plaintiff's securities class action
firms. 242 Under these circumstances, a traditional plaintiffs class action firm
may find it cost effective to contest the appointment of lead plaintiff by
attempting to show that the institution will not fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class as a whole or that the institution is subject to unique
defenses that render it incapable of adequately representing the class. 243 The
prospect of such a dispute may be sufficient to chill an institution's willingness
to press to become lead plaintiff.244
237. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2, at 2062-63.
238. 1933 Act, § 27(a)(3)(A)(i), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 738; 1934 Act, §
21D(a)(3)(A)(i), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 743.
239. Courts will presumably allow reimbursement of these expenses if the action is
successful, but there is obviously no guarantee that these expenses can be recovered. Moreover,
recovery may be at a distant date in the future if the action is protracted. Further, a plaintiffs'
firm may not find it appealing to prospect for cases only to find them bid away by competitors.
240. 1933 Act, § 27(a)(3)(B)(iii), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 739; 1934 Act, §
21D(a)(3)(B)(iii), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 744.
241. Bill Richards, Shareholder Law Raises Hurdle for Top Filer of Class Actions, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 4, 1996, at B1.
242. Firms in the traditional defense bar have demonstrated their willingness in certain
cases to litigate on the plaintiffs side securities cases using non-traditional fee structures.
Stephen Labaton, For F.D.LC.'s Top Law Firm, Fees Reaching $600 an Hour, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 1991, at Al (reporting that Cravath, Swaine & Moore agreed to represent the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation in a suit against Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham Lambert for
a minimum fee plus a contingency). There is no reason to believe that these finns would not be
willing to represent institutions in class actions.
243. See 1933 Act, § 27(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 739;
1934 Act, § 21D(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 744-45.
244. Such reluctance is certainly foreseeable with respect to the first institution that has to
step forward to litigate the most adequate plaintiff issue. Indeed, one can foresee that institutions
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Assuming that an institution actually secures the lead plaintiff
designation, undertaking that role may entail significant opportunity and other
costs relating to, among other things, discovery,245 as well as a heightened level
of scrutiny for the institution. Defendants may not want institutions to
participate actively in class actions, especially if those institutions pursue
strategies like those the Forum participants have designed, such as seeking to
deter future violations by requiring payments directly from culpable parties.246
It is therefore conceivable that these defendants may seek to discourage
institutional participation through their discovery practices. In particular,
defendants may broaden their discovery to focus on areas that may be sensitive
to the institutions, such as the institution's investment and trading practices. If
institutions are reluctant to disclose this information, they may avoid becoming
lead plaintiffs so as to divert this unwanted scrutiny. Simply put, institutions
may find that seeking the lead role is not cost-effective or they may simply be
reluctant, as they traditionally have been, to undertake the increased
responsibility and scrutiny that comes with the role.
For these reasons, institutions that seek to become active may be more
comfortable with initiatives that have both lower costs and lower visibility, like
those typified by the Forum's approach to institutional activism. These
strategies (which range from writing letters to counsel to formally objecting to
settlements or proposed attorneys' fees)247 allow the institution to take a much
more textured approach to activism than the "one-size fit all" model found in
the 1995 Reform Act.
Despite enactment of the 1995 Reform Act, there is still room for these
kinds of initiatives. Indeed, part of the Forum's success was the result of its
plan to utilize the inherent flexibility that continues to exist under Rule 23. Rule
23(d) in particular contemplates a flexible procedure under which parties may
voice their concerns during the course of the litigation, even if they are not the
lead plaintiff in the action or even without formal intervention. 248 That same
flexibility is emphasized in the Manual for Complex Litigation. 249 Indeed,
under current practice, the court "must exercise care that the appointment of
lead counsel does not deprive the other attorneys and their clients of an
might want to act together to become co-lead plaintiffs to prevent having to forge ahead alone.
The 1995 Reform Act permits the appointment of group lead plaintiffs. See 1933 Act,
§27(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 739; 1934 Act, §
21D(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 744 (noting that the rebuttable
presumption as to who is the most adequate plaintiff may be satisfied by a "person or group of
persons").
245. See 1933 Act, § 27(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 738; 1934
Act, § 21D(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 743 (noting that the lead plaintiff
must be willing to provide testimony at depositions or trial, if necessary). Although some of
these costs may be recoverable as part of any settlement, see 1933 Act, § 27(a)(4), 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 740; 1934 Act, §21D(a)(4), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.)
737, 745, there may be opportunity or other costs that may not be compensated.
246. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
247. See supra Section III.B.
248. Under Rule 23(d), the court has discretion to make appropriate orders to allow for
notice to class members of their rights to, among other things, "signify whether they consider
the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to
come into the action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
249. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.2 (3d




effective voice in the presentation of the class' case." 250 There is nothing in the
1995 Reform Act to prevent institutions from foregoing Congress' invitation to
become lead plaintiffs and to continue to experiment with these other initiatives.
The only potential problem with the Act is thus not any prohibition but the
possibility that it could chill such initiatives to the extent that it focuses attention
on one governance approach, even though other strategies may be better suited
to a particular case. To the extent that flexibility is lessened as a result of
courts' focusing on Congress' preferred mechanism, the window in which
institutions may effectively overcome collective action problems may narrow.
Although this result is not inevitable, it may constitute a significant potential
negative side-effect of the 1995 Reform Act.
In short, although the 1995 Reform Act creates considerable
opportunities for institutional investor activism, it also creates uncertainty over
the future course of such action. In light of this uncertainty, it may be
appropriate to question whether the 1994 Reform Act prematurely fixed on a
legislative solution to a collective action problem before private ordering was
allowed to run its course. Indeed, one could take the view that, strictly
speaking, the proposals in the bill were unnecessary because there is nothing in
the current interpretation of Rule 23 that prevents a court from taking any of
the actions contemplated in the new legislation.25' Nor, as the Forum's
experience in the Pentium case demonstrates, is the proposed legislation
necessary to permit shareholder activism in litigation. To the contrary, the
bill's proposals may actually prove to be detrimental to the extent that they
create a new arena for litigation, with the attendant costs, as class action
plaintiffs' counsel vie to have their clients appointed as lead plaintiff so they
will be named lead counsel. 252 These concerns make it impossible to say at this
time whether the legislation will, on the whole, promote or retard future
institutional initiatives in the area of shareholder litigation.
250. 7B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1792
(1986).
251. For example, courts already have sufficient discretionary power to appoint
institutions as lead plaintiffs, even in situations where institutions did not file the first complaint
against the defendant. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 249, § 30.16
(noting that the court "has wide discretion" in selecting who should be the representative
plaintiff). Indeed, Professors Weiss and Beckerman advocated that courts experiment with this
approach; they did not suggest that it be enshrined into law. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2,
at 2127.
252. Significant costs may be incurred in this determination. For example, the proposed
legislation contemplates that discovery will be available under certain circumstances concerning
whether a member of the purported class is the most adequate plaintiff. 1933 Act, §
27(a)(3)(B)(iv), 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 739; 1934 Act, § 21D(a)(3)(B)(iv), 1995






California Public Employees' Retirement System
College Retirement Equities Fund
Stanford Management Company
Wells Fargo Institutional Trust Company
February 22, 1995
Re: Whittaker v. Moore, Civ. No. 94-20855,
N.D. Calif., complaint filed Dec. 12, 1994,
stipulation of dismissal filed and entered, Feb. 9, 1995.
Re: Gunther v. Moore, Civ. No. 94-20878,
N.D. Calif.. complaint filed Dec. 21. 1994.
Dear Plaintiff and Defense Counsel:
The accompanying letter, dated February 8, 1995, related to the above
captioned proceedings.
On February 10, 1995, we contacted counsel in these proceedings to
inform them that the attached letter was forthcoming and to ascertain the status
of the litigation. We were thereupon informed that on February 9, a stipulation
of dismissal had been filed and entered in the Whittaker class action securities
fraud proceedings. Plaintiff counsel in that case were previously unaware of the
existence of the accompanying letter, and we concur with counsels' independent
decision to stipulate to dismissal.
We were subsequently informed that counsel in the Gunther derivative
action had initiated discussions regarding potential dismissal of the derivative
claims as well. On Friday, February 17, we contacted plaintiff counsel in the
Gunther action and learned of counsel's views regarding the continuing merits
of the derivative claims. We thereupon faxed to plaintiff counsel a copy of the
attached letter, and later the same day we were notified of an agreement in
principle to stipulate to dismissal of the derivative actions on grounds of
mootness. The existence of that agreement was confirmed on Tuesday,
February 21. We concur with counsels' decision to so stipulate.
The attached letter, dated February 8, is being forwarded to counsel on
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California Public Employees' Retirement System
College Retirement Equities Fund
Stanford Management Company
Wells Fargo Institutional Trust Company
February 8, 1995
Re: Whittaker v. Moore, Civ. No. 94-20855,
N.D. Calif.. complaint filed Dec. 12, 1994.
Re: Gunther v. Moore, Civ. No. 94-20878,
N.D. Calif., complaint filed Dec. 21. 1994.
Dear Plaintiff and Defense Counsel:
Whittaker v. Moore, Civ. No. 94-20855, N.D. Calif., complaint filed
Dec. 12, 1994, asserts class action securities fraud claims on behalf of all
persons who purchased common stock or warrants of Intel Corporation
between January 1, 1994, and December 9, 1994. The seven name plaintiffs in
Whittaker each purchased between 100 and 1,000 Intel shares during the class
period alleged in the complaint.
Gunther v. Moore, Civ. No. 94-20878, N.D. Calif., complaint filed
December 21, 1994, asserts derivative claims on behalf of Intel Corporation.
The name plaintiff in Gunther holds an unspecified number of shares of Intel
stock.
The Whittaker and Gunther complaints arise from a common fact pattern
relating to a flaw in certain floating point calculations performed by Intel's
Pentium chip.
The California Public Employees' Retirement System has assets in excess
of $80 billion. The college Retirement Equities Fund has assets in excess of $60
billion. Stanford Management Company has assets in excess of $4 billion. Wells
Fargo Institutional Trust Company has contractual responsibility for accounts
in excess of $160 billion. In the aggregate, these entities have responsibility for
assets in excess of $300 billion.
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Each of these entities purchased common stock or warrants of Intel
Corporation between January 1, 1994, and December 9, 1994. Each entity is
thus a member of the class alleged in the Whittaker complaint. Each of these
entities is also currently a shareholder of Intel. In the aggregate, these entities
purchased hundreds of thousands of Intel shares during the alleged class period
and continue to own several million shares of Intel stock.
The Whittaker Complaint
The Whittaker complaint alleges securities fraud by Intel and some of its
senior executives and directors. The complaint alleges that: (1) Intel deceived
investors by failing to disclose a known flaw in certain floating point
calculations performed by Intel's Pentium chip; (2) this deception caused class
members to purchase Intel shares at artificially inflated prices; and (3) certain
Intel insiders sold stock at these inflated prices. The complaint also alleges that
Intel insiders perpetrated the fraud to protect and enhance their executive
positions and prestige, as well as to enhance the value of their Intel stock
holdings and options.
We question the merits of the Whittaker complaint. Our concerns are
based on three distinct considerations.
First, as explained below, the behavior of Intel's stock price appears
inconsistent with the theory alleged in the Whittaker complaint. Second, the
sales by Intel insiders recited in the complaint fail to support an inference of
fraud. Third, bugs are not rare in computer hardware or software. They are
generally resolved without major stock market consequences. The Whittaker
complaint fails to allege any basis upon which Intel's executives or directors
knew or had reason to know that the Pentium flaw would, unlike other
hardware or software bugs, have a material market or financial impact.
1. Intel's Stock Price Performance.
Whittaker alleges that Intel's failure to disclose the Pentium flaw
artificially inflated the price of Intel's shares. If that theory is correct then the
price of Intel's stock should have suffered a material and permanent decline
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Table 1 lists the closing price of Intel's shares on a daily basis from
January 2, 1994, the first trading day within the alleged class period, to
February 3, 1995, the most recent date for which data are available in
connection with the preparation of this letter. Figure 1 plots these data.
The Pentium flaw was publicly disclosed for the first time on Sunday,
October 30, 1994, through a posting on the Internet. Figure 2 focuses on Intel's
stock price performance since that disclosure and notes the dates on which
certain events related to the Pentium flaw were disclosed.
The price patterns displayed in Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the stock
market impact of the Pentium flaw was transitory. This "transitory Pentium
value gap" is most clearly apparent after IBM's announcement on December 12,
1994, that it disputed Intel's estimate of the frequency with which the Pentium
flaw would affect chip operations and that it would cease shipping Pentium-
based PCs. This gap appears to be most pronounced on December 19 when Intel
stock closed at $57.813.
On December 20, 1994, Intel announced a change in its chip replacement
policy. Instead of requiring that customers demonstrate cause in order to obtain
a replacement chip, Intel agreed to offer replacement chips on a "no-questions-
asked" basis. On that day, and in response to that announcement, the value gap
closed substantially as Intel's stock price increased by 5.9 percent to $61.25.
Intel's stock price thereafter continued to rise on a fairly regular basis. It
reached levels in excess of $68.81 on each and every trading day following the
filing of Intel's Form 10-Q on January 18, 1995. That filing disclosed Pentium-
related reserves of $475 million.
Visual inspection of Figures 1 and 2 thus suggest that the Pentium-related
decline in Intel's share price was temporary and was apparent only during the
period immediately preceding Intel's December 20 change in its replacement
policy. Visual inspection of Intel's stock price since December 20 also suggests
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We recognize that this analysis of Intel's stock price does not adjust for
broader fluctuations in the market as a whole or for fluctuations specific to the
semiconductor industry. It also does not test for the statistical significance of
changes in Intel's stock price. Exhibit A addresses these concerns and reports
the results of a variety of tests of statistical significance. The statistical analyses
reported in Exhibit A are consistent with the conclusion reached by simple
visual inspection of Figures 1 and 2, and reaffirm that there appears to be no
permanent decline in Intel's share price attributable to Pentium-related events.
The transitory nature of this value gap raises serious questions regarding
the damage theory underlying the Whittaker complaint. More fundamentally,
the transitory nature of the Pentium value gap is consistent with an alternative
explanation of Intel's stock price performance that is unrelated to securities
fraud.
Intel's stock price declined in response to Pentium-related events only
during the time that Intel required customers to make a showing of need in
order to obtain a replacement chip. The presence of a "need-based" customer
returns policy thus seems to be a necessary condition for the Pentium-related
price decline. Once Intel adopted a "no-questions-asked" policy, its stock price
rose to levels higher than those prevailing immediately before disclosure of the
Pentium flaw. Such a price pattern would result if Intel had not engaged in any
fraud and the market was responding to customer concern over the incidence of
the flaw in the Pentium chip. The cause for such concern would be eliminated
by the new replacement policy. Accordingly, the observed stock price pattern is
consistent with the hypothesis that Intel was truthful throughout.
2. Stock Sales by Intel Officers and Directors.
The insider sales alleged in the Whittaker complaint were executed at
prices ranging from $57.50 to $63.11 a share. The price of Intel stock has,
however, remained above $63.11 on every trading day since December 29,
1994, and the date of this letter.
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Every selling insider would therefore have been better off had he
continued to hold his shares through the disclosure of the Pentium flaw and
through the resolution of subsequent Pentium-related events. It is difficult to
suggest that insiders who suffered foregone profits by selling too soon at a
price that would now be considered too low were selling because they believed
that Intel's stock price was inflated. The more detailed analysis contained in
Exhibit A supports these conclusions.
3. Did Management Have Reason to Believe that the Pentium
Flaw Would Have a Material Effect?
The Whittaker complaint alleges that Intel knew of the Pentium flaw well
before it was disclosed to the market. The complaint does not, however, allege
any facts supporting the inference that Intel, its officers, or its directors, knew
or had reason to know that disclosure of the Pentium flaw would have a
material adverse effect on the price of Intel's stock or on Intel's financial
performance.
Hardware and software bugs are common in the computer industry. None
of these bugs, to the best of our knowledge, have caused a market response
comparable to that observed in connection with news of the Pentium flaw. The
magnitude of the market's response to disclosure of the Pentium flaw appears to
be without precedent.
Under those circumstances it is natural to question whether the market
consequences of the Pentium flaw were reasonably foreseeable to Intel's
management. Unless there is reason to believe that management knew or had
reason to know that the market's response to the Pentium flaw would be
materially different than its response to disclosures of flaws in other
microprocessors or software programs, there is no reason to believe that
management knew or should have known that it was engaged in securities
fraud. The absence of any allegations that would support such an inference








The Gunther complaint alleges that Intel's directors and officers breached
their fiduciary obligations owed to the corporation to assure that the Pentium
chip was marketed, tested, and developed with the appropriate degree of
internal controls. It also alleges a breach arising from false concealment of the
Pentium flaw. The complaint further alleges that Intel's directors and officers
had an incentive to conceal the flaw so as to enhance their bonus compensation
and to profit from the same stock sales alleged in the Whittaker action.
The Gunther complaint relies on the decline in Intel's stock price as
evidence of harm caused by these alleged breaches. It further complains of the
costs imposed by the Whittaker action and by class action product liability
claims. In addition, it alleges harm to Intel's reputation, and further damage as
a consequence of the need to establish a reserve to cover the costs of Intel's chip
replacement program.
The merits of the Gunther complaint are subject to question for the same
reasons discussed above in connection with the Whittaker action. The derivative
nature of the Gunther suit also raises additional and distinct concerns.
As already explained, Intel's stock price performance does not support an
inference of fraud. The stock price data also fail to support the inference that
Intel's management has engaged in any action that has permanently reduced the
value of Intel's shares. The allegations of insider sales in Gunther fail to
support an inference of breach of duty for the same reasons that they fail to
support an inference of fraud in Whittaker.
The Gunther complaint also fails to articulate any basis on which Intel's
management knew or had reason to know that the Pentium flaw would have an
unprecedented market impact. Absent such foresight on the part of Intel's
management, the Gunther complaint merely alleges mismanagement by
hindsight. Such claims suffer the same deficiencies as claims of fraud by
hindsight.
The derivative claim that Intel's management breached fiduciary duties
because their conduct precipitated the filing of various class actions lawsuits
also appears to be without foundation because, as already explained, those
securities fraud class actions suits appear themselves to be without merit. The
consumer class action suits appear themselves to be without merit. The
consumer class actions also appear to lack merit in light of Intel's decision to
replace Pentium chips on a "no-questions-asked" basis.
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The allegation that Intel has suffered because of a loss of reputation also
seems questionable. No other microprocessor, manufacturer has, to our
knowledge, demonstrated a willingness or ability to engage in a replacement
campaign of the magnitude now being undertaken by Intel. Moreover, the price
performances of Intel stock following announcement of the replacement
campaign belies any permanent loss of reputation.
For all these reasons, derivative litigation of the sort articulated by the
Gunther complaint appears not to promote the corporation's interests or the
interests of its shareholders.
Concluding Observations
Simply because a lawsuit can be filed does not mean that it should be
filed. As counsel in this action are well aware, there is substantial public
concern over private class action securities fraud litigation. This concern is
reflected in recent Congressional hearings, statements by the Chairman and
Commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the academic
literature, and elsewhere.
While private class action securities claims have recovered substantial
sums for many investors, we share the concern that weak complaints can
impose substantial and unnecessary costs on publicly traded firms that are
forced to defend against such actions. The imposition of such costs do not
promote the investor interests that class action counsel purport to represent.
Derivative actions that piggyback on securities fraud complaints and that
restate essentially identical claims as breaches of fiduciary duty raise
comparable concerns. Moreover, the multiplication of litigation that results
when securities claims spawn parallel derivative actions serves only to
compound the public policy concern over the costs imposed by unwarranted
litigation.
For the reasons stated above, we respectfully request that counsel in the
Whittaker and Gunther actions reconsider the prudence of their stated claims.
Needless to say, if counsel are able to allege facts more substantial than those
that appear on the record to date our views regarding the merits of either
lawsuit may evolve. However, based on currently available information, the
Whittaker and Gunther complaints seem to be clear examples of the sort of
litigation that can do more harm than good and that do not promote the
interests of the very investors on whose behalf the claims are ostensibly filed.
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A copy of this letter is being forwarded to the Office of the General
Counsel of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission in response
to Chairman Arthur Levitt's recent announcement of the creation of a
Litigation Analysis Unit that will evaluate private class action claims.
Yours truly,
[Signed by: (1) Professor Joseph A. Grundfest, Stanford Law School; (2)
Richard H. Koppes, General Counsel, CalPERS; (3) Laurence R. Hoagland,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Stanford Management Company; (4)
Charles H. Stamm, Executive Vice President and General Counsel, College
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Table 1
Intel Closing Price




Date Price Date Price Date Price
7121/94 $58.484 9/26/94 $62.688 11/30/94 $63.125
7/22/94 $57.875 9/27/94 $62.500 12/1/94 $62.625
7/25/94 $57.813 9/28/94 $61.500 12/2/94 $62.875
7/26/94 $57.313 9/29/94 $61.625 12/5/94 $64.125
7127/94 $56.813 9/30/94 $61.500 12/6/94 $64.500
7t28/94 $57.875 10/3/94 $60.250 12/7/94 $64.750
7/29194 $59.250 10/4/94 $58.000 12/8/94 $62.750
8/1/94 $59.625 10/5/94 $58.750 12/9/94 $62.750
8/2/94 $59.500 10/6/94 $58.938 12/12/94 $60.375
8/3/94 $59.000 10/7/94 $59.438 12/13/94 $60.500
8/4/94 $57.250 10/10/94 $60.438 12/14/94 $60.375
8/5/94 $58.125 10/11/94 $60.500 12/15/94 $58.625
8/8/94 $58.000 10/12/94 $59.750 12/16/94 $59.500
8/9/94 $59.250 10/13/94 $58.875 f2/19/94 $57.813
8/10/94 $59.750 10/14/94 $58.500 12/20/94 $61.250
8/11/94 $60.375 10/17/94 $58.188 12121/94 $62.625
8/12/94 $60.188 10/18/94 $58.250 12/22/94 $63.125
8/15/94 $60.750 10/19/94 $60.000 12/23/94 $62.938
8/16/94 $61.563 10/20/94 $60.688 12/27/94 $63.359
8/17/94 $63.750 10/21/94 $60.500 12/28/94 $62.500
8/18/94 $63.563 10124/94 $59.500 12/29/94 $64.375
8119/94 $63.438 10/25/94 $58.938 12/30/94 $63.875
8/22/94 $63.656 10/26/94 $60.000 1/3/95 $63.750
8/23/94 $64.250 10/27/94 $60.500 1/4/95 $63.625
8/24/94 $64.188 10/28/94 $62.250 1/5/95 $64.125
8/25/94 .565.125 10/31/94 $62.125 1/6/95 $65.000
8/26/94 $66.000 11/1/94 $61.375 119/95 $66.000
8/29194 $66.125 11/2/94 $62.500 1/10/95 $66.625
8/30/94 $66.406 11/3/94 $61.875 1/11/95 $66.250
8/31/94 $65.750 11/4/94 $60.375 1/12/95 $67.125
9/1/94 $64.250 11/7/94 $60.125 1/13/95 $68.125
9/2/94 $64.234 11/8/94 $60.813 1/16/95 $68.125
9/6/94 $63.984 11/9/94 $61.250 1/17/95 $67.000
9/7/94 $66.375 11/10/94 $61.125 1/18/95 $69.375
9/8/94 $66.875 11/11/94 $60.625 1/19/95 $70.688
9/9/94 $65.750 11/14/94 $62.250 1/20/95 $68.813
9/12/94 $64.500 11/15/94 $61.563 1/23/95 $70.375
9/13/94 $65.250 11/16/94 $61.125 1/24/95 $71.500
9/14/94 $65.375 11/17/94 $62.125 1/25/95 $70.875
9/15/94 $67.000 11/18/94 $63.938 1/26/95 $70.438
9/16/94 $66.875 11/21/94 $66.125 1/27/95 $71.000
9/19/94 $67.250 11/22/94 64.750 1/30/95 $70.000
9/20/94 $66.000 11/23/94 $65.125 1/31/95 $69.375
921/94 $65.375 11/25/94 $63.875 2/1/95 $70.625
9/22/94 $64.500 11/28/94 $65.250 2/2/95 $72.188
9/23/94 $63.250 11/29/94 $65.500 2/3/95 $73.500
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EXHIBIT A
An Analysis of Intel Corporation's
Stock Price Performance from
October 28, 1994, to February 3, 1995
This memorandum reports on the results of a statistical analysis of Intel
Corporation's stock price performance from October 28, 1994, to February 3,
1995. To control for the effect of both market-wide and semiconductor
industry-specific factors on Intel's stock price, we regressed Intel's daily stock
price returns on daily Nasdaq returns and on daily orthogonalized equal-
weighted Hambrecht & Quist Semiconductor Industry Index returns (from
which Intel's own stock price was first excluded). The regression was estimated
using data from October 28, 1993, to October 28, 1994, the year preceding the
first Internet disclosure of the Pentium flaw. The results of this regression are
reported in Table A-1. As is apparent, the relevant coefficients and the
regression itself are highly significant.
These regression results were then used to calculate daily net-of-market
returns over the period from October 28, 1994, to February 3, 1995. As Table
A-2 reveals, single-day net-of-market returns that are positive and statistically
significant at the 95% confidence level are discernible on November 18 and 21,
December 19, and January 18 and 23. Negative net-of-market single day
returns that are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level are
discernible on November 25 and 30, and on December 12 and 15.
To test for the transitory nature of the Pentium price gap, however, it is
necessary to determine whether a price decline is followed by a recovery such
that, at the end of the transitory gap, there is no discernible, continuing stock
price effect. Conducting such a test requires specifying a starting date when the
gap begins and then determining if and when that gap disappears.
Table A-2 presents results of such a test using October 28, 1994, as a
base date from which to measure the Pentium value gap. October 28 was the
last trading day preceding disclosure of the Pentium flaw on the Internet. In
Table A-2 the first column under the October 28 Base Date heading describes
the cumulative value of a $100 investment in Intel stock made on October 28,
1994, net-of-market and semiconductor index returns. By February 3, 1995,
this $100 investment would, on a net of market basis, have grown to $118.20.
This return just misses statistical significance at the 90% confidence level. Put
another way, Intel outperformed the market over this period, and an investor
who bought $100 of Intel would have been $18.20 richer than would be
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predicted based on the performance of the Nasdaq market and of the Hambrecht
& Quist Semiconductor Index. Even on December 19, 1994, when Intel's stock
hit its lowest price during this period, Intel's stock price remained above its
predicted performance, if measured from an October 28 base date.
October 28 is not, however, the only date from which it is possible to
measure a Pentium value gap. November 21 marks a temporary peak in Intel's
stock price during the period following the disclosure of the Pentium flaw.
Table A-3 documents tests of statistical significance measured from that peak as
the beginning of a value gap in Intel's stock price.
By that measure, the largest degrees of underperformance were apparent
on December 15 and December 19 when Intel's cumulative stock price
performance was below the market's by 5.31 percent and 4.98, respectively.
However, neither of these measures are statistically significant and by
December 20 Intel's stock price was back in line with the market, showing a
statistically insignificant 0.04 percent performance above predicted price levels.
Thus, using November 21 as the starting date suggests that a statistically
significant Pentium value gap never emerged at all and that the adverse
consequences of the Pentium disclosures, such as they were, had dissipated by
December 20. By February 3, Intel had outperformed its predicted price by
8.88%, although this performance is not statistically significant measured from
a November 21 base date.
The most powerful statistical support for the existence of a Pentium value
gap arises if the gap is measured from December 9, the last trading day prior to
the IBM announcement. The results of that analysis are reported in Table A-4.
That analysis indicates underperformance at a 90% confidence level on
December 12, and again from December 15 through December 19. The
underperformance relative to the market, rather than in absolute terms, peaks
on December 15 when Intel's price is 8.08 percent lower than predicted on the
basis of historical relationships with Nasdaq and other semiconductor stock
prices. The statistical significance of Intel's underperformance disappears,
however, on December 20 when Intel's relative underperformance declines to a
statistically insignificant 2.89 percent.
Measured from this December 9 base, Intel's stock price thereafter
fails to display any statistically significant deviation from historical
market relationships. By the end of January, Intel's stock outperforms the
comparable market index by statistically insignificant amounts. By
February 3, an investment in Intel outperforms the comparable Nasdaq and
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semiconductor indexes by 5.69%. These positive performances are, however,
statistically insignificant.
Thus, even if a stock price analysis is conducted with the specific intent
of finding the starting date from which the evidence of underperformance is
most pronounced and without any effort to justify the selection of that starting
date, the evidence of statistically significant underperformance quickly
dissipates. The value gap in Intel's stock price attributable to Pentium-related
events is therefore transitory, even under "worst case" assumptions.
Equivalent statistical analyses have been conducted for the Standard &
Poor's 500 Index with and without the orthogonalized Hambrecht & Quist
Semiconductor Index (excluding Intel), and for the Nasdaq Index alone. While
each of these models generate different patterns of returns and of statistical
significance, they all indicate that statistically significant cumulative net of
market price effects do not continue beyond December 20, 1994. Intel's
underperformance due to Pentium-related events, if such underperformance
ever existed in the first instance in a statistically significant sense, ceased to be
statistically significant upon the change in Intel's return policy. This conclusion
is supported without regard to the model specification employed or to the
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Table A-2: Intel v. Nasdaq and Orthogonalized H&Q Semiconductor Index
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10/29194 $620 2.89% 1.13% 2.54% 0.85% $100.00 0.00% 2.68% 0.00%
1013194 $6207 .0.20% 0.17% 0.09% .0.34% $99.66 .0.04% 3,78% 13,79%
11114 $61.32 -1.21% -0.68% .06% -0.58% $99.08 -0.92% 4.64% 30.12%
111294 102.45 1.83% -0.05% 0.93% 1.48% 1100.5M 0.56% 5.35% 16.13%
113194 061.82 .1.00% 0.04% 0.37% .1.16% $99.39 -0.61% 5.8% 15.79%
11/4/94 $60.32 -2.42% .0.78% .1.73% .0.95% S98.45 .1.55% 6.56% 35.60%
1117194 S60.07 -0.41% -0.49% -1.84% 0.88% $99.32 .0.68% 7.08% 14.91%
118314 $0.76 1.14% 0.69% 1.56% .0.09% $99.23 .0.77% 7.57% 185.75%
1119194 $61.20 0.72% -0.04% 1.19% 0.24% S99A8 -0.52% 8.03% 10.18%
11110194 $61.07 .0.20% .0.37% -2.55% 1.33% $100.80 0.0% 8,46% 14 61%
11111194 $60.57 .0.82% .0.30% 0.10% .0.58% $100.21 0.21% 8.80% 370%
11114194 42.20 2.68% 0.79% 1.84% 1.23% 1101.45 1.45% 9.27% 2402%
1815194 $61.51 -1.10% 0.11% 0.24% .1.26% $100.17 0.17% 9.65% 2.72%
11116194 $61.07 .0.71% 0.08% .0.24% .0.62% 199.55 -0.45% 10.01% 7.04%
11117194 162.07 1.64% .0.49% 1.34% 1.46% $101 O 1.00% 10.36% 15,00%
11118/94 $63.88 2.92% 0.15% 0.15% 3.02% * 1104.85 4.05% 10.70% 54 15%
1121a94 166.07 3.42% 0.91% .0.30% 4.34% * $108.06 8.50% 11-03% 87,18%
11122194 $64.70 -7-8% .2.18% -3.69% 1.44% $110,13 10 13% 11.35% 9196%
81123194 $65.07 0.58% .0.61% .0.47% 1.34% $111.60 11.60% 11.67% 94 87%
11125194 $63.82 -1.92% 0.79% 1.38% .3.15% * $108.09 809% 11.97% 8146%
1110 $65.19 2.15% 0.43% 0.02% 1.04% $110.07 1007% 12.26% 8926%
1129194 $65.44 0.38% 0.77% 0.70% .0.52% $10.90 9.50% 12.55% 1622%
1110194 163.07 -3.63% 0.15% .1.09% -2.95% * $106.27 6.27% 1283% 66 17%
821194 162.57 -0.79% -1.29% -1.51% 1.00% $107.33 7.33% 13 11% 7270%
12194 $62.82 0.40% 0.60% 1.40% .0.69% $106 0 6.0A% 1338% 6600%
I25194 $64.07 1.99% 0.09% 0.70% 1.63% $108.34 8.34% 13.65% 7688%
1216194 $64A 0.59% .0.60% .1.12% 1.63% $110.11 0.11% 1391% 0437%
1217194 $64.70 0.39% -0.94% .1.76% 2-01% $112.32 12.32% 14.16% 9118%
12/0194 $02.70 .3.09% .06% .3.85% 0.41% $112.78 1278% 14.41% 91.78%
8219194 $62.70 0.00% .0.01% 1.92% .0.04% $111.04 11.04% 466% 88.65%
12/194 160.32 .3.79% 0.01% .0.15% .3.68% * $107.2 7.72% 14.0% 69.04%
12/13194 S60.45 0.21% 0.05% .0.90% 0.63% $108.40 8.40% 15,14% 7233%
82/1494 $0.32 -0.21% 0.86% 1.41% .1.51% $106.77 6.77% 13.37% 6117%
I2/13194 $58.58 -2.90% 0.69% 0.66% .3.72% * $102.80 2.0% 1M.60% 2746%
12/16194 $59.45 1.49% .0.22% -0.97% 2.17% 1105.02 5.02% 15.83% 4661%
12119194 $57.76 .2.84% .0.16% .1.9D% .1.78% $103.16 316% 16.06% 3000%
21=0194 $61.20 5.95% 0.09% 1.37% 5.29% * $108.61 8 61% 1628% 7002%
12121194 162.57 2.5% 1.18% 1.36% 0.71% $109.38 9.38% 16.30% 7348%
12=194 $63.07 0.00% 0.30% .0.03% 0.61% $110085 10.05% 16.71% 76,14%
12/3194 $62.88 -0.30% 0.39% 0.2% .0.81% $109.16 9.16% 1693% 71.12%
12/27/94 $63.381 0.67% 0.54% 3.01% .1.12% $107.94 7.94% 17.14% 6363%
12 $62.45 .1.36% -0.50% .0.28% .0.78% $107.10 7.10% 1734% 57.79%
12f29194 $64.32 3.00% 0.95% 1.54% 1.56% 18.78 8.78% 17.55% 67,31%
12/30/94 163.82 -0.78% 0.32% .0.87% -0.59% $108.14 8.14% 17.75% 63.11%
113195 163.70 .0.20% .1.11% .1.02% 1.22% $10946 9.46% 17.95% 69.83%
114195 $63.57 .0.20% 0.30% 0.50% .0.63% 1108.77 877% 1813% 6,06%
115195 $64.07 0.79% .0.02% 0.17% 0.77% $109.62 9.62% 1835% 69.57%
116195 $64.94 1.37% 0.54% 2.67% .0.26% $109,33 9.33% 184% 67.58%
119195 165.94 1.54% 0.32% 1.87% 0.46% S109.83 983% 1873% 69.61%
1/10195 $66.97 0.95% 0.59% 3.60% .15% $108.56 8.6% 18.92% 62.47%
1111195 166.19 .0.56% 0.10% .1.22% 0.13% $108.70 8,70% 19.11% 62.79%
1112195 $67.07 1.32% 0.10% 4.89% .0.91% $107.63 7.63% 19.30% 56,18%
13195 $68.07 1.49% 0.75% .0.70% 1.26% $108.99 8.99% 19.48% 6340%
1116195 168.07 0.00% 0.79% 0.22% 0.69% $108.23 8.23% 1967% 58,79%
1117195 166.94 .1.63% 0.52% .0.85% -1.63% $106.46 6.46% 198% 47.08%
1185 169.32 3.55% 0.03% 1.23% 2.99% * $196 90.65% 2003% 65$2%
1119195 $70.63 1.89% 0.50% .0.32% 249% $11238 12.38% 2020% 77.02%
1/20195 $66.75 .2.65% .0.85% .1.59% -1.9% $111.05 11.05% 20.38% 7119%
1123195 $70.32 2.27% .0.33% .1.29% 3.18% * $114.58 1458% 20.56% 833%
1124195 $71.44 1.60% 0.49% 1.15% 0.72% 1115.41 15,41% 20,73% 85.48%
125195 $70.82 .0.87% 0.29% .7-34% 0.49% $115.97 1597% 20,0% 86.58%
126195 $70.44 .0.53% .0.45% .1.35% 0.50% 3110.56 1656% 2107% 07.64%
1/27/95 $71.00 0.80% 0.18% 1.37% 0.07% $11664 1664% 21.24% 87.52%
1]-0195 $70.00 -1.41% .0.93% -2.18% 0.40% $117.11 17,11% 21.41% 8827%
1131195 $69.38 .0.89% 0.45% .0.64% .0.91% S116.03 16 03% 2158% 85.48%
2/195 $70.63 1.00% 0.41% 2.14% 0.52% $116.64 16 C4% 21.74% 866%
212195 $72.19 2.21% 0.70% 1.46% 1.01% $117.82 1782% 21.91% 88.92%
2/3195 $73.50 1.82% 1.10% 1.41% 0.32% 118.20 1820% 22.07% 8 40%
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Table A-3: Intel v. Nasdaq and Orthogonalized H&Q Semiconductor Index
ROOEW StIaOteoIy Meontne
Ifld Cloe 11&Q .EdthOd SOalmoAntt Cumulative Ctumlotivo 9S%
AdJited S-aeondoto Dolly Net of 90% Netof Net of OSLkttdu
for R-Iw. RowlN.dq rlndeo(0et Matet Coefloe Market Market lgoll e Ogotlcm














































































































































































































$100.00 0.00% 2.68% 0.00%
$101.44 1.44% 3.78% 54.49%
$102.80 2.80% 4.64% 76.33%
$99.56 -0.44% 5.35% 2.81%
$101.39 1.39% 5.98% 35.13%
$100.87 0.87% 6.56% 20.43%
$97.89 -2.11% 7.08% 44.12%
$98.07 -1.13% 7.57% 23.11%
$98.19 -1.81% 8.03% 34.19%
$99.79 -0.21% 8.46% 3.0%
$101.42 1.42% 8.08% 24.64%
$103.46 3.46% 9.27% 53.54%
$103.88 3.88% 9.65% 56.98%
0103.02 3.02% 10.01% 44.50%
$99.23 .0.77% 10.36% 11.62%
$99.85 -0.15% 10.70% 2.19%
$98.34 -1.66% 11.03% 23.13%
$94.69 -5.31% 11.35% 44.00%
$96.74 -3.26% 11.67% 41.61%
$95.02 -4.98% 11.97% 58,53%
$100.04 0.04% 12.26% 0.55%
$100.75 0.75% 12.55% 9.31%
$101.37 1.37% 12.83% 16.55%
$100.55 0.55% 13.11% 6.56%
$99.43 -0.57% 13.38% 6.69%
$98.66 -1.34% 13.65% 15.32%
$100.20 0.20% 13.91% 2.22%
$99.61 -0.39% 14.16% 4.33%
$100.83 0.03% 14.41% 0.94%
$100.19 0.19% 14.66% 2.07%
$100.97 0.97% 14.90% 10.14%
$100.70 0.70% 15.14% 7.25%
$101.16 1.16% 15.37% 11.79%
$100.00 0.00% 15.60% 0.04%
$100.19 0.13% 15.83% 1.27%
$99.14 -0.86% 16.06% 8.33%
$100.39 0.39% 16.28% 3.73%
$99.69 -0.31% 16.50% 2.92%
$90.07 -1.93% 16.71% 17.94%
$101.00 1.00% 16.93% 9.25%
$103.51 3.51% 17.14% 31.23%
$102.29 2.29% 17.34%. 20.39%
$105.54 5.54% 17.55% 46.40%
$106.30 6.30% 17.75% 51.34%
$106.83 6.83% 17.95% 54.39%
$107.36 7.36% 18.15% 57.34%
$107.43 7.43% 18.35% 57.30%
$107.87 7.07% 18.54% 59.45%
$106.88 6.8% 18.73% 52.85%
$107.44 7.44% 18.92% 55.91%
$108.03 8.33% 19.11% 61.83%
$108.88 8.88% 19.30% 63.26%
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Table A-4: Intel v. Nasdaq and Orthogonalized H&Q Semiconductor Index
Rn'EW Sltt!eodly korentnae
Ioa Cloe H&Q EdOoad SIgealslutot Ct=nulatlve Coeoatlve 957,
AdjSd 5lnloooduto DolY Net of 95% Nd of Net of stdIdLo
for R owdoal %,z=wTdq rlmdox (et Market Cotdeneo Mitid Market 870l lcaoce l .
hate DMdedng Retr= Rt=n of ie Return Level POW Ro Rood.r Level
10/3/994 $6220 2.89% 1.13% 2454% 0.85%
10/31/94 $62.07 -0.20% 0.17% 0.09% -0.34%
11/194 $61.32 -1.21% 0.68% ..06% -0.8%
11/2/94 32.45 1.83% -0.05% 0.93% 1.48%
11)3/94 $61.82 -1.00% 0.04% 0.37% -1.16%
114/94 $90.32 -42% .0.78% -1.73% .0.95%
11f7/94 $90.07 -. 41% -0.49% -1.L4% 0.88%
1184 360.76 1.14% 0.69% 1.56% -0.09%
11/9/34 361.20 0.72% -0.04% 1.19% 0.24%
11/10/4 $61.07 .0.20% -0.37% -255% 1.33%
11111/94 $60.57 .0.82% 0.30% 0.10% 0.58%
1111494 32.20 2.68% 0.79% 1.4% 1.23%
11115/94 $61.51 -1.10% 0.11% 014% -1.26%
111694 $61.07 0.71% 0.08% 0.24% 0.62%
11)17/94 62.07 1.64% 0.49% 1.34% 1.46%
11118/94 63.88 292% -0.15% 0.15% 3.02% 0
1121/94 $66.07 3.42% -0.91% 0.30% 4.34%
1122/94 $64.70 -2.08% .2.18% -3.69% 1.44%
112354 $65.07 0.58% .0.61% -0.47% 1.34%
I2594 $63.82 -1.92% 0.79% 1.38% .3.15%
111894 $65.19 2115% 0.43% 002% 1.04%
1112994 $65.44 0.38% 0.77% 0.70% 0.52%
11/30/94 63.07 -3.63% 0.15% -1.09% -2.95%
12/194 $62.57 -0.79% -[29% -1.51% 1.00%
12094 $62.82 0.40% 0.60% 1.40% .0.69%
125/94 364.07 1.99% 0.09% 0.70% 1.63%
12/6/94 $64.45 0.59% 0.90% -1.12% 1.63%
12f7/94 $64.70 0.39% -0.94% -1.76% 2.01%
12)8/94 362.70 -3.09% -2.06% -3.85% 0.41%
12/994 $62.70 0.00% 0.01% 1.92% 094% $100.00 000% 2.68% 0.04%
12)12/94 $90.32 -3.79% 0.01% 0.15% .368% * $96.32 -368% 378% 94,31%
12/1394 $6045 0.21% 005% 0.90% 0.63% $9693 -307% 4 64% 0.061%
12/14/94 360.32 4.21% 086% 1.41% -1.51% $95.47 -453% 535% 90.32%
12/15/94 $38.3 2.90% 0.69% 0.66% -3.72% 0 $91.92 8.08% 598% 99.19%
12/19/94 $59.45 IA9% 0.22% 0.97% 2.17% $93.91 6.09% 6.56% 93.15%
12/19/94 $57.76 -2.04% -0.16% .1.90% -1.78% $92.24 -7.76% 708% 96.83%
1220194 $61.20 5.95% 0.09% 1.37% 5.29% * $7 11 -289% 7.57% 5450%
12)2194 $62.57 2.25% 1.18% 1.36% 0,71% $97.00 .220% 803% 40.X8%
1220/94 $63.07 0.80% 0.30% -003% 061% $9840 -168% 846% 28.89%
12/2394 $62.89 -0.30% 0.39% 0.62% -0.81% 97 61 -2.39% 888% 4028%
1212794 $63.31 0.67% 0 $4% 3.01% -1.12% $9652 -3.48% 927% 5386%
12/2/94 $62.45 -1.36% -0.50% 0.28% 0.78% $9577 .4.23% 965% 6101%
122994 $64.32 3.00% 0.95% 1,54% 1.56% $97.26 -2.74% 10-01% 40,77%
1230/94 $63.82 0.78% 0.32% 0.87% -0.59% $9669 -3.31% 10.36% 46.04%
1/3/95 $63.70 .0,20% -1.11% -1.02% 1.22% $9787 -2.13% 1070% 30.29%
1/4/95 $63.57 0.20% 0.30% 0,50% 0.63% $97.26 .2.74% 11.03% 3734%
1/5/95 $64.07 0.79% 0.02% 0.17% 077% $9801 .1.99% 11.35% 26r4%
1/6/95 364.94 1.37% 0.54% 2-67% 0.26% $97,76 2.24% 11.67% 29.40%
1/995 S65.94 1.54% 0.32% 1.07% 0.46% $9820 .1.00% 1197% 23.16%
111095 $66.57 0.95% 0.59% 3.60% -1.15% $97.07 -2.93% 12.26% 36.05%
8/1105 $66.19 .0,56% -10% .1.22% 0.13% $7.20 -2.00% 12.53% 33,83%
11125 $67.07 1.32% 0.10% 4.89% -0.98% $9624 -3,76% 1283% 43.40%
1113/95 $68.07 1.49% 0.75% 0.70% 1.26% $97.45 .2.55% 13.11% 29,70%
1116/95 $68.07 0.89% 0.79% 0.22% 4.69% $96.77 -3.23% 13.38% 36.35%
1117/95 $66.94 -1.65% 0.52% -0.85% -1.63% $95.20 -4.80% 1365% 50.98%
1/18/95 $69.32 3.55% 0.03% 1.23% 2.99% $98,05 -1.95% 13.91% 21.69%
1119/95 $70.63 1.89% -0.50% 4.32% 2.49% $10048 048% 14,16% 53%
1/20/95 $60.75 -2.65% 0.85% -1.59% -. 19% 399.29 4.71% 14.41% 7.65%
1/23/93 $70.32 2.27% -0.33% -1.29% 3.10% * $102.45 2.45% 14 66% 2570%
1/24/95 $71.44 1.89% 049% 1.15% 0,72% $113,19 3 19% 1490% 3253%
1/25/95 $70.82 -087% -0.29% .2.34% 0.49% $113.70 370% 15.14% 360%
1/26/95 $70.44 -0.53% 045% -1.35% 0.50% $104.22 422% 1537% 40.94%
1/27/95 $71.00 0.00% 0.18% 1.37% 0.07% $10429 429% 1560% 4100%
1/30/95 $70.00 -L41% -0.93% -2.18% 0.40% $10471 4.71% 1583% 44.82%
1/31/95 $69.38 0.89% 0.45% -0.64% -0.91% $10375 375% 16.06% 35.31%
2/1/95 $70.63 1.80% 0.41% 2.14% 0.52% $10430 430% 1628% 39.50%
2f2/95 $72.19 2.21% 0.70% IA6% 1.01% $105.35 535% 16.50% - 47.52%
21/395 $73.50 1.82% 1.10% 1.41% 0.32% $10569 569% 16.71% 49.53%
